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The Economics of Enmity
Ward Farnswortht
This Article considers whether courts should regard enmity between litigants as a transac-
tion cost and thus as a justification for awarding damages when a property right would otherwise
be available as a remedy. It begins by examining the phenomenon of enmity generally, and con-
cludes that enmities can be both ethically justified and instrumentally useful depending on their
origin& The normative status of enmity also depends on the consequences of how it is expressed.
The law understandably tends to punish enmity when it motivates out-of-pocket expenditures to
make someone else worse off, but generally not when it motivates the absorption of opportunity
costs for that purpose. It is very difficult for courts to distinguish between "good" and "bad" enmi-
tie; however, and the Article argues that in most cases the best way for courts to cope with this un-
certainty is to disregard enmity when fashioning remedies Exceptions to the rule may be war-
ranted in cases where particular enmities readily can be identified as offensive to public policy or
where they will create significant costs for courts or innocent third parties. The Article defends
these views against the claim that enmity is best understood as a variety of emotion that justifies
damages remedies in cases where it is likely to be pervasive.
INTRODUCrION
There is a large literature on the pros and cons of using property
rights (for example, injunctions) and liability rules (that is, damages)
as remedies at the ends of various sorts of lawsuits. The common
premise of the literature is that in fashioning remedies courts ought to
take into account, building on Ronald Coase's famous insight,' that af-
ter judgment the parties may be able to bargain around whatever
remedy the court has awarded. It can be argued, for example, that if
bargaining between the parties will be easy, then using a property
right as a remedy makes sense because the parties will be able to ne-
gotiate their way to an efficient allocation of the property after the
case is over. Much of the ensuing discussion in the literature focuses
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on the complications created for such bargaining by rational, strategic,
profit-maximizing behavior by either party.
3
My interest here lies in a different set of possibilities: parties who
do not have the preferences of homo economicus. In a prior article I
examined a series of nuisance disputes that ended with the issuance of
property rights to one side or another, but where no bargaining oc-
curred after judgment either because relations between the parties
had become too acrimonious by the time the case was over or because
the parties regarded the rights involved as poor subjects for cash ex-
changes. The purpose of this Article is to consider how courts ought
to deal with the first of these possibilities-for example, the property,
contract, or other case in which a plaintiff might seem entitled to an
injunctive remedy, but where enmity between the parties runs high. If
it is clear that the parties to such a case are not going to bargain after
judgment-regardless of who wins, let us suppose-because the litiga-
tion has reached the status of "feud," might this be a good reason to
withhold the injunction and instead to award damages in an amount
to which the parties might have agreed if their relations had not be-
come so thoroughly poisoned?
Eric Posner suggests in a recent paper5 that when a defendant's
behavior provokes enmity between himself and a plaintiff, courts
should indeed be disinclined to award the plaintiff a property right as
a remedy, as bargaining over it will be too difficult. I take a different
view, regarding enmities as frequently normal and sometimes useful
aspects of human preferences rather than as temporary emotional in-
terruptions of the preferences people hold while in a "calm state.
6
The question is a close and interesting one from the standpoint of
economic analysis, which typically assumes not only that people try to
satisfy their preferences efficiently, but also that the preferences gen-
erally consist of a desire to maximize wealth without reference to
likes and dislikes toward possible trading partners. When this last as-
sumption is relaxed, analysis becomes more complicated, requiring
value judgments about how much weight to give to preferences that
have a controversial ethical footing and unclear social consequences.
The preferences bound up in the phenomenon known as enmity are
especially vexing because enmity is both a fearsome engine of human
misery and a natural and potentially salutary human reaction to injus-
3 See note 1.
4 Ward Farnsworth, Do Parties to Nuisance Cases Bargain after Judgment?:A Glimpse in-
side the Cathedral, 66 U Chi L Rev 373 (1999). See also George Loewenstein, Out of Control:
Visceral Influences on Behavior, 65 Org Beh & Human Dec Processes 272,288 (1996).
5 Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 Georgetown L J 1977, 2006-10 (2001)
("Money damages are the superior remedy when the nuisance creates anger and hard feel-
ings ... Injunctions are more suitable when emotion is unlikely to interfere with bargaining.").
6 Idat1978.
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tices and wrongs. Enmity thus furnishes a case study in how economic
analysis might accommodate complex and difficult preferences.
I shall argue that enmity exists in good and bad varieties from
both an ethical and economic standpoint. One of my goals will be to
rehabilitate the bad reputation that enmity generally enjoys. Whether
any particular instance of enmity is laudable or lamentable depends
on its origins and expression. Unfortunately, courts usually lack the
ability to differentiate between good and bad enmity in any given
case, and any more general solution to the problem-treating enmity
as a transaction cost, or treating it as just another source of prefer-
ences-is bound to create errors of various sorts. The important ques-
tions thus are which types of errors are most bothersome, and what
other policies might be advanced or retarded by awards of property
rights in circumstances dominated by enmity. My general thesis is that
a liberal strategy of ignoring enmity, and thus of awarding property
rights even where enmity will foreclose bargaining after judgment, is
usually the better approach for courts to take.
I will begin in Part I by locating the problem of enmity within a
larger set of commodification preferences people may have about
whether and when to treat their entitlements as subjects of bargain-
ing, and will suggest that the hard questions about such preferences
from an economic standpoint are whether and when they should be
considered types of transaction costs. Part II briefly discusses the rela-
tionship between enmity and settlement. Part III argues that enmity
can be ethically justified and instrumentally useful depending on its
origins and how it is expressed. It may be an ethically justified conse-
quence of misbehavior by another party and the danger that enmity, if
created, may cause bargaining to break down creates an important in-
centive for parties to cooperate ex ante. Part IV surveys the law's
treatment of enmity elsewhere, and finds it broadly consistent with
the understandings of enmity just described. It is punished when it
motivates out-of-pocket expenditures to make someone else worse
off, but generally not when it motivates the absorption of opportunity
costs for that purpose. And enmity is not punished at all when the
consequences it motivates are good, suggesting that, at least in this
setting, the consequences of acts are more important to the law than
their moral origins.
Part V of this Article argues that it is very difficult for courts to
distinguish in practice between good and bad enmity, so the hard
question is how enmity should be handled when the extent of its rea-
sonableness is unknown and when it may result in a forgone transac-
tion that otherwise would have made both parties better off I argue
that the law ordinarily should pay no attention to enmity when fash-
ioning remedies, though exceptions to the rule may be warranted in
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cases where the enmity readily can be identified as offensive to public
policy or where it will create significant costs for courts or innocent
third parties. Part VI defends this view against the claim that enmity is
a variety of emotion that justifies damages rather than property rights
when it is present.
I. COMMODIFICATION PREFERENCES GENERALLY
In a world where everyone is happy to bargain over everything
with anyone, there might be just two useful questions in thinking
through problems of valuation and the efficient formulation of reme-
dies: how much each person would be willing to bid for any given en-
titlement, and the size of the transaction costs involved (that is, how
expensive bargaining would be as a practical matter). But in situations
where people are not always happy to bargain over things, or to bar-
gain with just anyone, it is important to have ways to think about such
preferences. I will call those considerations commodification prefer-
ences. The term is meant to cover all preferences regarding whether
and in what circumstances to sell an entitlement-not only whether to
treat a right as a commodity, but also when and in exchange with
whom. Occasionally such preferences may dominate all other prefer-
ences concerning an entitlement (for example, the animal that is "free
to a good home" or the case in which A would rather not buy at all
than buy from B); in other circumstances they may be inconsequen-
tial. It is useful in any event to have a way to denote and call attention
to often overlooked preferences not quite for things but about those
things and whether and when and to whom they should be sold.
It may be convenient to think of commodification preferences as
those that diverge from the preferences participants in an auction
would be expected to have. A seller at an auction normally wants to
obtain the highest possible bid for his goods without caring who the
bidder is. The farther we move toward areas of life in which people do
not regard their rights as suitable subjects for an auction, the more
significant the commodification preferences we encounter. This way
of thinking has illustrative value but is potentially misleading, for bid-
ders at auctions do have commodification preferences of their own;
they have decided that the items on the block are suitable subjects for
a cash sale, and express those preferences by participating in the auc-
tion. The commodification preferences are just less visible because
they meld with the bidders' preferences for the goods on which they
are bidding. But once a buyer succeeds in acquiring goods at an auc-
tion, a more interesting set of preferences may come into play: he may
be disinclined to resell them, or more inclined to resell them to some
bidders than to others. Those commodification preferences may affect
his price, sometimes in complicated ways; and if those preferences no
[69:211
The Economics of Enmity
longer meld seamlessly with the price he would pay (or require) at an
auction, they are consequential and are of interest to students of
valuation.
Vigorous commercial markets, like auctions, may be character-
ized by nearly invisible commodification preferences. In these situa-
tions-the market for peas, for instance-knowing how much cus-
tomers are ready to bid for a good often will tell us everything useful
to know about their valuation of it. It would not add anything to learn
about the customers' commodification preferences, because they do
not care where they buy the good, or from whom. One nevertheless
can imagine separating commodification preferences from others
even here. If you thought that peas were being treated as overly fun-
gible, or that peas harvested by nonunionized workers should be the
subject of a boycott, you might want to contest the prevailing and in-
visible commodification preferences widely held about peas.
The preferences I want to consider are those that do diverge
from the preferences of participants in auctions. It is on those occa-
sions that multiple and potentially conflicting dimensions of valuation
are present and it is then that it becomes most useful to distinguish
commodification preferences from other preferences. Litigation can
furnish such instances. When people resort to courts to establish their
rights, the rights often may be the subject of heated attachment and
conflict. The process of resolving a dispute through litigation may it-
self cause changes in those attachments and conflicts, and in other as-
pects of the parties' relationships to their rights and to each other.
And since in many litigation settings bilateral monopoly is a common
characteristic of parties' relations after judgment, there often will be
no room for an arbitrageur to enter the picture and mitigate the con-
sequences of any commodification preferences the parties have vis-A-
vis each other. Commodification preferences then have the potential
to be an important source of error in valuation by a court, because by
definition they often will not be registered in any visible market, mak-
ing them difficult to price. The notion of commodification preferences
that are distinct in interesting ways from the preferences people have
at auctions thus may or may not be of great interest to an economist
examining a thick market, but the idea has potential interest in par-
ticular for economic analysts of law.
Several additional points about commodification preferences are
worth bearing in mind from the outset. First, my claim is not that
commodification preferences are likely to be infinitely valuable to
their holders. It is that they can be valuable enough to be consequen-
tial. If we speak of someone who regards a property right as inc-
ommensurable with cash, we generally do not mean that there is no
price at which the person would sell the right. Such extraordinary
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cases may or may not exist, but we normally have in mind the less
dramatic situation where those views merely cause the holder of a
right to resist bargaining enough to prevent a deal from being made.
In effect, the price necessary to overcome the reservations about
commensurability is greater than the surplus from trading that would
exist if the resistance were not in the way. The commensurability
problem, even if not infinite, is decisive and prevents a sale. The same
story can be told about cases in which enmity or other preferences or
norms about the circumstances of sale make otherwise productive
bargaining prohibitively difficult.
Next, commodification preferences should be distinguished from
irrationality. Rationality is, of course, a term used in many different
ways by different writers. When economists use it, they typically mean
people's propensity to match their means to their ends with as little
waste of their resources as possible.7 They normally aspire to agnosti-
cism about the content of the preferences people may have: "Ration-
ality means little more to an economist than a disposition to choose,
consciously or unconsciously, an apt means to whatever ends the
chooser happens to have."' But much economic analysis also relies on
additional and less explicit assumptions:! that people have no objec-
tion in principle to bargaining over any given entitlements they hold,
or that they will not permit their views of other people to interfere
with an otherwise advantageous deal. At first these might seem to be
aspects of the assumption mentioned a moment ago that people
match their means to their ends. Perhaps people who want to avoid
treating certain entitlements as bargaining chips are violating that as-
sumption-and behaving irrationally-by failing to seize chances to
maximize their pecuniary wealth. Yet it is an economic commonplace
that people seek to maximize not pecuniary wealth but their satisfac-
tion.'° Thus if people take satisfaction in avoiding bargaining and are
7 A rich discussion of possible definitions is found in Jon Elster, Sour Grapes: Studies in
the Subversion of Rationality 1-42 (Cambridge 1983). Cooter and Ulen define rationality as re-
quiring that the parties' preferences be "stable" in the sense that they "must be transitive at any
point in time, and they must not alter very quickly with the passage of time." Robert Cooter and
Thomas Ulen, Law and Economics 234 & n 8 (Harper Collins 1988). See also Robert H. Frank,
The Strategic Role of the Emotions: Reconciling Over- and Undersocialized Accounts of Behav-
ior, 5 Rationality & Socy 160,161-62 (1993) (examining definitions of rationality, including "the
efficient pursuit of whatever goals one happens to hold at the moment of action" and "the effi-
cient pursuit of self-interested preferences").
8 Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 17 (Aspen 5th ed 1998).
9 See Elster, Sour Grapes at 10 (cited in note 7).
10 Richard A. Posner, Overcoming Law 16 (Harvard 1995):
The individual imagined by economics is not committed to any narrow, selfish goal such as
pecuniary wealth maximization. Nothing in economics prescribes an individual's goals. But
whatever his goal or goals ... he is assumed to pursue them in forward-looking fashion by
comparing the opportunities open to him at the moment when he must choose.
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willing to forgo benefits to indulge this preference, there is nothing
inconsistent with economics in recognizing and accounting for this. At
least much of the time, then, commodification preferences might best
be considered aspects of the parties' ends: part of what they want, not
impediments to their obtaining what they want. Perhaps some com-
modification preferences are indeed irrational, but there is no more
reason to regard them that way generally than there is to condemn
any other set of preferences as irrational.
Rationality may also be used in a lay sense to refer to reason-
ableness, or to an ability to discipline one's immediate wishes so that
they do not interfere with one's long-term interests. It is in roughly
these senses that "irrationality" becomes a pejorative. But neither of
these senses of rationality is what economists mean by the term, nor is
either what I mean by commodification preferences-which may or
may not be reasonable, and which may or may not serve the long-
term interests of their holders. The economist's assumption of ration-
ality is not an assumption that people have reasonable-looking utility
schedules; the investment banker, the oil painter, and the suicide
bomber equally may be described as rational in the economist's sense.
Likewise, the holder of vigorous preferences about whether to sell his
entitlements, and to whom, may also be described as rational.
Third and finally, it is also possible to conflate too easily
commodification preferences with transaction costs. Again, the latter
term has been defined variously by different writers: it has been
suggested that transaction costs are obstacles to bargaining that in
principle could be overcome by technology," or that "zero transaction
costs" implies cooperative bargaining,2 or that zero transaction costs
is the assumption "that we can ignore all costs of buying and selling
other than the price paid,"'' or that a world without transaction costs
is "an ideal world peopled by homines economici.' These verbal
formulations obscure the distinction between obstacles to transacting
that are practical (too many parties) and consensual (too much
acrimony). But as they are applied in practice the definitions
invariably refer to the practical obstacles that may prevent parties
Economics "does not assume that individuals are motivated solely by selfishness or material
gain. [Economics] is a method of analysis, not an assumption about particular motivations"
Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101 J Polit Econ 385,
385 (1993).
11 Mark Kelman, Consumption Theory, Production Theory, and Ideology in the Coase
Theorem, 52 S Cal L Rev 669,686-87 (1979).
12 A. Mitchell Polinsky, An Introduction to Law and Economics 17 (Little, Brown 2d ed
1989).
13 David D. Friedman, Price Theory: An Intermediate Text 100 (South-Western 2d ed
1990).
14 A.W. Brian Simpson, Coase v. Pigou Reexamined, 25 J Legal Stud 53,95 (1996).
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from effecting their consent to a bargain-the logistics involved in
getting large numbers of people together, or the difficulty tortfeasors
would have in identifying their victims before injuring them. As I
have argued elsewhere, "transaction cost" is best understood as a
normative category; to label something a transaction cost is to say
that it should not be counted-that it is something courts or others
ought to try to reduce or eliminate.'5 Transaction costs get in the way
of deals that would make both parties better off by their own lights.
Nobody likes them. Commodification preferences, by contrast, refer
instead to a variety of subjective values, to certain types of reasons
why parties might not care to bargain even if it were technologically
cheap to do so. As we shall see, it is arguable that some commodifica-
tion preferences should be treated as transaction costs (in other
words, that courts should try to get rid of them or minimize their im-
pact). Indeed, one way to frame this Article's inquiry is that it consid-
ers whether enmity should be considered a transaction cost. But
again, as a class, commodification preferences are no more unreason-
able or regrettable than any other preferences, and cannot be consid-
ered synonymous with transaction costs.
II. ENMITY AND SETrLEMENT
This Article considers the difficulties raised by one sort of com-
modification preference: a preference of A not to sell to B because
their relations are poisoned by enmity. The root of the problem is that,
while one might not realize it by reading economic accounts of litiga-
tion, parties who litigate often dislike each other by the end of a suit,
if not at the beginning. This can significantly complicate attempts at
bargaining after the case is over. Of course, parties to some types of
suits may regard litigation in a more cold-blooded fashion: they liti-
gate to judgment simply because they have made divergent predic-
tions about how the court will decide the case, and after the court
renders its judgment they are ready to negotiate from whatever point
of departure its decision has created. But a different pattern also is
possible. Some people litigate to judgment in significant part because
the process of private bargaining has broken down irreparably. The
process of litigation that follows tends not to endear parties further to
one another. By the time a court enters a decision in such a case, the
prospects for productive negotiations between the parties may have
been impaired or ruined by the bad blood between them. Then the
court's determination either way is likely to be final, just as in cases
where conventional transaction costs run high. But here the reason
15 See Farnsworth, 66 U Chi L Rev at 408-10 (cited in note 4) ("[D]eciding whether []
departures [from economic rationality] are transaction costs involves a normative decision.").
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for the finality is not that bargaining is costly or infeasible, but rather
that it is foreclosed by aspects of the parties' own preferences. How
should a court respond? Should enmity be considered a type of trans-
action cost, justifying an award of damages rather than an injunction,
or is it just another preference?
It seems clear enough as an initial matter that courts should not
get into the business of making case-by-case assessments of whether
the enmity that has developed between the parties in any given case is
sufficient to make bargaining between them unlikely. For if anything
were to hang on such a determination-the choice between damages
or equitable relief, or anything else-a perverse incentive would be
created for one side or the other to generate enmity. Nevertheless, it
may be possible to identify in advance categories of cases in which, on
account of the likely presence of enmity, it does not make sense to as-
sume that the parties to a case will bargain to some desirable state of
affairs after judgment.
A possible objection to this line of inquiry is that it focuses too
much on cases that are litigated all the way to judgment. Of course, in
many of those cases acrimony may run high; litigation is like that. But
when courts make rules, the objection goes, they should assume that
most of the people they affect will be settling in the "shadow of the
law, 16 with enmity a nonissue. I am not so sure. Elsewhere I have re-
corded skepticism about assumptions that even if people who litigate
to judgment fail to act like homines economici, people who settle
their disputes do act that way.'7 First, it is a mistake to suppose that if
parties settle their cases, as they frequently do, enmity must not have
been a significant or indeed decisive factor in the resolution they
reached. If the law makes entirely clear that a lawsuit between A and
B would end with the issuance of a property right to A, there is little
reason for the parties to bother litigating to judgment; but this point is
separate from the question of what A demands of B for purposes of
settlement. A may stand on his rights and insist on their full enforce-
ment without much in the way of compromise. Enmity between the
parties may cause him to take this position even if a significant sur-
plus from bargaining over the property right to which he is entitled
would exist but for the enmity. If B decides to capitulate rather than
litigate, as well he might when the likely outcome of the potential liti-
gation is clear, a "settlement" results. But the settlement just means
that the case in court was dropped, not necessarily that the parties
16 See generally Robert H. Mnookin and Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of
the Law: The Case of Divorce, 88 Yale L J 950 (1979).
17 See Farnsworth, 66 U Chi L Rev at 414-16 (cited in note 4) (suggesting that settlement
might be motivated by noneconomic motives such as upholding local norms).
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agreed to substitute cash for enforcement of the property right to
which one of them was legally entitled.
The extent of the role enmity plays after judgment or in the set-
tlement of any particular class of cases is unknown, but may be con-
siderable in some circumstances. Imagine disputants arrayed along a
spectrum according to their interest in ensuring that the resolutions of
their disputes track the outcomes they would achieve with litigation
to judgment. At one end of the spectrum are people'8 who may not be
sure what a court would say about their disputes, and who are not in-
terested in consulting a lawyer to find out. At the other end are those
people interested only in what their lawyers tell them a court will be
likely to do about their dispute. The likelihood that a court will award
an equitable remedy or damages becomes more important to parties
and their negotiations as we move from the beginning to the end of
that spectrum. Now imagine another spectrum of disputants, this time
arrayed according to the extent of their enmity. At one end are dispu-
tants who are friends. Then there are those who are not friends, but
who have an interest in preserving decent relations with their adver-
saries, either for business reasons or out of a sense of community or
decency. At the far end are those who detest each other and who
would prefer not to make their adversaries better off if they can avoid
it. It is only a modest extension of Professor Ellickson's research '9 to
hypothesize that there is a considerable overlap between the two
spectrums just described: that parties who get along well also are
more likely to resolve their differences according to norms, and that
parties who hate each other are likely to be among the most keenly
interested in the details of whether they will get an injunction or
damages from a court resolving, say, a property dispute between them.
Of course, enmity is not the only predictor of whether parties will be
negotiating squarely in the shadow of the law. No doubt the law also
tends to become more important as the stakes of a dispute get larger.
But if I am correct in describing the tendencies of disputants, it fol-
lows that when courts make rules about remedies, the class of settling
litigants for whom the details of those rules are critical may also tend
some significant percentage of the time to be a class for whom enmity
is likely to be a factor.
Enmity also may be a phenomenon that consumes resources in
negotiations, with the parties getting over it for a price -an acrimony
18 Corporate behavior may be a separate question. For a discussion, see id at 411 (hy-
pothesizing that corporations and their officers may act differently than individuals in the litiga-
tion context because of their duty to shareholders).
19 See Robert C. Ellickson, Order without Law: How Neighbors Settle Disputes 270-75
(Harvard 1991) (noting that parties often settle nuisance disputes according to local norms
rather than law).
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premium of some sort.2° Compare Judge Richard Posner's description
of bilateral monopoly as a source of high transaction costs:
Although the frustration of a potentially value-maximizing ex-
change is the most dramatic consequence of bilateral monopoly, it
is not the usual consequence. Usually the parties will bargain to a
mutually satisfactory price. But still bilateral monopoly is a social
problem, because the transaction costs incurred by each party in
an effort to engross as much of the profit of the transaction as pos-
sible are a social waste. They alter the relative wealth of the parties
but do not increase the aggregate wealth of society.21
It is possible to speak of enmity in comparable terms: sometimes
likely to prevent an exchange that otherwise would seem to be value-
maximizing, and also capable of just raising the cost of reaching an
agreement. The important questions are (1) whether and when enmity
is likely to play this sort of role in disputes, and (2) what stance the
law should then take toward it.
This Article is concerned with the second question rather than
the first. It assumes that there are areas-themselves bilateral mo-
nopolies, most likely in litigated disputes between individuals, and es-
pecially but not only between individuals in forced proximity to one
another, as in a neighborhood-where enmity is likely to be signifi-
cant. The question is how courts ought to respond to such situations:
whether they ought to regard the enmity as a kind of transaction cost
that justifies withholding equitable relieft and instead award damages
meant to resemble the deal the parties might make for themselves if
they were on good terms.
III. ENMITYASA SOURCE OF VALUE
This Part examines enmity as a source of value, suggesting that it
is not always a bad thing. It argues for the importance of distinguish-
ing between enmities along several dimensions: their origins (whether
they are based on breaches of norms, or on unreasonable reactions to
conflicts of interest), the appetites they create (the impulse to avoid
an enemy, or the impulse to find pleasure in an enemy's misery), and
how they are expressed (passively, through refusals to transact, or ac-
tively, through out-of-pocket expenditures to make an enemy worse
off). Enmities corresponding to the first members of these pairs may
be ethically defensible and economically useful. The second members
of those pairs are what give enmity a bad name.
20 For a discussion of acrimony premiums, see Farnsworth, 66 U Chi L Rev at 392-94
(cited in note 4) (defining an acrimony premium as the "amount required to be added to [the]
price in order to get the winner to hold its nose and make the deal").
21 Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 69 (cited in note 8).
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First, what is enmity? When one person injures others, or breaks
a promise, or otherwise seems to have violated a norm, it is easy to
understand why the injured parties would take his behavior into ac-
count in planning their affairs and in deciding whether to expect him
to behave that way again. But often aggrieved parties do more than
merely take such behavior into account for planning purposes. They
get mad at the person they perceive as a wrongdoer. They take it per-
sonally. They don't "like" the person anymore, and may develop an
aversion to him. The result is enmity: a dislike of another, generally
accompanied by a felt sense of hostility or identification of the other
as an enemy.
Enmity is a curious and ethically ambiguous feature of human re-
lations and preferences. There are people who do not like country
music, or English cooking, or rats. They may feel strongly about these
things, their judgments being backed by emotion as well as reason
(what could it mean to have a purely reasoned opposition to English
food?). A simple distaste for dealing with another may seem no more
problematic than a taste or distaste of any of those other sorts, regard-
less of its emotional content. But enmity also can differ from these
preferences because it involves distaste for another person -another
member of the community whose own sense of utility is regarded as
relevant, unlike the rat (at least on most views of whose utility
counts). Complications thus arise when enmity gets expressed in a
way that not only increases the utility of one of the players in a
drama, but also depletes the utility or wealth of the other in some way,
as either an intended or an incidental consequence. Then the ethical
standing and likely consequences of enmity both are likely to depend
heavily on details of context and expression: whether enmity is the
force behind a public decision or a private decision; whether it is ex-
pressed in more or less destructive ways; whether the enmity is of a
particular variety that is considered acceptable or unacceptable, or is
thought to have costs for others not parties to the relationship; and
why the enmity came into existence.
To begin with the first of these considerations, there are signifi-
cant differences between the standing normally given to enmity as a
motive for behavior in public and that afforded it in private life. When
enmity is condemned as a motivator, it often is in the context of pub-
lic decisionmaking- for example, in debates about the moral status of
retributive anger as a basis for criminal punishment or the propriety
of other expressions of emotion through law or by public actors."
22 See generally Robert C. Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance: On Law and the Satisfaction of
Emotion, in Susan A. Bandes, ed, The Passions of Law 123 (New York 1999), and many of the
other essays in Bandes's book; Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements,
63 U Chi L Rev 361 (1996); Jeffrie G. Murphy and Jean Hampton, Forgiveness and Mercy (Cam-
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When making a utilitarian calculation at a collective level, of course, it
is indeed necessary to make decisions about which kinds of benefits
and preferences to count and which to "launder." Expressions of
enmity toward individuals or groups through legislation or executive
action generally are regarded as taboo for a variety of sound constitu-
tional and policy reasons. There is the sentiment, common to many
political theories, that government ought to exist to serve all those
citizens subject to it, and not to "get" any of them. There is the practi-
cal and well-known fact that when expressed collectively, the power of
enmities to do annihilating harm is awful and difficult to restrain once
loosed. These reservations about enmity may not prevent it from
creeping as a motive into various corners of the law, but they do tend
to drive it out of the discourse. Politicians supporting capital punish-
ment usually say that it is for the sake of deterrence, and tend to re-
nounce enmity toward murderers as an explicit reason for it or for
any public action." If courts cannot satisfy themselves that a public ac-
tion has some basis other than enmity, they invalidate it." This much
at least is the law and custom in domestic affairs. In dealing with for-
eign adversaries, enmities regarded as just and well earned may on
occasion be publicly displayed, perhaps as attempts to signal the pres-
ence of courage and moral hardiness."
Our question is a bit different, for it involves enmity as a motiva-
tor of private retaliation. Enmity in private life is commonplace,
among other things as a residue of conflicts of interest and as a nor-
mal reaction to perceived misbehavior by others. The litigants in the
nuisance cases considered in my prior study," for example, usually
were angry with each other because one of the parties was pursuing
(Cambridge 1988).
23 For a discussion of this sort of laundering, see Robert E. Goodin, Utilitarianism as a
Public Philosophy 132-48 (Cambridge 1995).
24 See Cass R. Sunstein, Leaving Things Undecided, 110 Harv L Rev 4, 69, 78 (1996)
(discussing reasons why animus is regarded as a forbidden ground for public decisions).
25 See Dan M. Kahan, The Secret Ambition of Deterrence, 113 Harv L Rev 413, 434-51
(1999) (suggesting that capital punishment is a case in which citizens and officials emphasize ar-
guments based on deterrence because of social norms against expressing contentious moral
judgments).
26 See, for example, Romer v Evans, 517 US 620, 634-35 (1996) (holding unconstitutional
an amendment to the Colorado constitution because, among other reasons, the Court believed it
was based on impermissible animus toward homosexuals).
27 See, for example, Mike Allen, An Unvarnished President on Display, Wash Post A7
(Sept 19,2001) (reviewing President George W. Bush's spoken responses to the September 11,
2001, terrorist attacks); Blaine Harden, After the Attacks: The Reaction; For Many, Sorrow Turns
to Anger and Talk of Vengeance, NY Tunes A15 (Sept 14,2001) (describing the public reaction
to the attacks); National Editorial Pages Call for Retaliation, White House Bulletin (Sept 12,
2001) (noting the retributive character of many national newspapers' editorials in response to
the attacks).
28 Farnsworth, 66 U Chi L Rev at 381-82 (cited in note 4).
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his interests in a way that to him seemed reasonable, but that in some
way injured his neighbor and to him seemed unreasonable. The in-
jured neighbor's indignation and protests, in turn, seemed to the first
neighbor an unreasonable invasion of his right to do as he pleased.
Each neighbor thus comes to view the other as threatening, and as a
violator of norms. The neighbors come to dislike each other; their re-
lations might be permanently soured and rounds of retaliatory moves
might follow, including a refusal to bargain.
When enmity so motivates private acts or refusals, it raises diffi-
cult problems of counting and discounting individual utilities that in
some ways resemble but in other respects differ from the problems
encountered when enmity motivates public decisions. The worries
about abuse of public power recede, but problems of what satisfac-
tions to include in the calculus of costs and benefits remain. Private
acts motivated by enmity create satisfaction for their makers in a per-
fectly understandable sense of the term, and the satisfaction may well
be expressible economically in dollars spent on the act or dollars for-
gone because of it. But the satisfaction often comes at the expense of
others, unlike more usual economic activities that create benefits for
the actor while making others better off as well. In some cases the sat-
isfaction of enmity may simply require that the enemy be avoided. It
may manifest, in other words, as a commodification preference
against dealing with an adversary. In other cases enmity may motivate
acts that are satisfying only to the extent that they make others worse
off-the problem of interdependent negative utilities. In such cases
there may be no net increase in well-being. There may be a zero-sum
game in which A's pleasure increases precisely to the extent B's de-
creases, or it may be that A's satisfaction is smaller than B's dissatis-
faction.
Here the economic objection to the "transaction" is that it really
results in no increase in net wealth or utility at all. Where there is a
real gain-where B's dissatisfaction is more than offset by the satis-
faction A derives -economists may indeed recognize this as a wealth-
maximizing move, but there remain other objections on economic
grounds. They include the practical difficulty of knowing whether
there really is a net gain from such a forced transaction, and the unde-
sirability of forcing people to take costly precautions against such acts.
The sum total of happiness in the world-and the sum total of
wealth-may be greater the moment after A hits B in the face with a
pie than it was a moment earlier, but the sum total in a world where
29 See Posner, Economic Analysis of Law at 228-29, 261 (cited in note 8) (discussing the
treatment of interdependent negative utilities in the law of intentional torts and in criminal
law).
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such acts are permitted may be smaller than in a world where they are
forbidden. The wealth-maximizing rule thus forbids most such acts,
treating them as cases where the actor is bypassing the market despite
the presence of low transaction costs.3
There is an additional danger in the act motivated by a wish to
make another worse off, no matter how much satisfaction it brings its
maker. The act may well create additional enmity in the person sub-
ject to it, and so give rise to more such acts-that is, retaliation and
feuding. Each fresh act of retaliation may or may not bring its maker
more satisfaction than it takes away from its victim, but again it is al-
ways hard to say and most people no doubt have a clear and general
metapreference for avoiding the creation of this set of preferences in
the first place. The vengeful satisfaction I obtain from burning down
my enemy's house because he threw a pie in my face may outweigh
his dissatisfaction (I might pay more to an arbitrageur for the pleas-
ure of doing it than my enemy would pay to avoid it), but probably we
both would prefer to have avoided having these preferences and the
package of satisfactions and dissatisfactions they bring with them. All
else equal, a society full of feuds is likely to be worse off-less desir-
able to all concerned-than a society with fewer of them, even if the
parties to the feuds derive satisfaction from them. From the pleasure
that a person may take in retaliating for a wrong once it has occurred,
it does not follow that a community is better off with wrongs and cy-
cles of retaliation than it is without those things.
The considerations just outlined might seem a conclusive case
against giving effect to enmities through law, were it not for the im-
portance of accounting for the history of an enmity before evaluating
it-the importance, in other words, of viewing enmity as a dynamic
rather than a static phenomenon. The history is important both be-
cause it may give an enmity strong ethical footing and because in a
private social order enmity can serve as an important enforcer of
norms and motivate the provision of a valuable public good. Envision
a set of neighborly norms about keeping promises, respecting bounda-
ries, playing music no louder than a certain volume, curbing one's dog,
lending assistance to others in need, being flexible and willing to dis-
cuss compromises when interests conflict, and so forth. Some of these
norms are backed by law, and some are not, but regardless of how
they are backed, their usual observance and enforcement has little to
do with their legal standing. They exert their pressure as a practical
matter either because they have been internalized into obligations of
conscience or because breaches are likely to lead to reputational sanc-
30 Id at 226 ("[W]hen market transaction costs are low, people should be required to use
the market if they can and to desist from the conduct if they can't.").
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tions or sublegal retaliatory sanctions by others. If you breach by
playing loud music and are unresponsive to requests to modify your
behavior, the first line of response may not be legal-I may retaliate
by playing loud music of my own, by spreading damaging gossip about
you, or by declining to help when you are in need . Or I may retaliate
by refusing to bargain with you, now or after judgment, if the dispute
between us ripens into litigation.
A person's ability to give some effect to these sorts of enmities-
and especially to reply to a wrongdoer by declining to transact with
him-is an important feature of his autonomy. In some times and
places it has been thought more obvious than in the present United
States that incivilities are not appropriately redressed with cash.3 Yet
even in this day and age it normally is taken for granted that if we be-
lieve someone has done us wrong, we at least have the right to avoid
him, to withhold consent to dealings with him, and to make these de-
cisions on a basis that is felt as well as thought-a right to our enmi-
ties, in short, which may be well earned. Existence sometimes involves
encounters with evil, not to mention more prosaic insults and obnox-
iousness, and we define ourselves in part by our identification of those
things and how we choose to react to them. Such decisions are consti-
tutive of a person's character, so it is not surprising that they are the
subject of teachings in most ethical and religious traditions. Those
traditions tend to eschew enmity as a motive for action, of course, and
in a moment we will consider some possible reasons why. They may
also counsel against entertaining enmities at all,33 though in fact their
teachings tend to be a good deal more complicated than that. Most
moral traditions acknowledge a place for earned enmities of various
sorts, or at least for choosing to avoid helping or transacting with oth-
ers whose behavior is morally objectionable." In any event, there can
31 See Ellickson, Order without Law at 57-59 (cited in note 19) (describing self-help re-
taliatory measures taken by ranchers in trespass disputes).
32 See the interesting discussion in James Q. Whitman, Enforcing Civility and Respect:
Three Societies, 109 Yale L J 1279, 1316-34 (2000) (exploring past and current regulation of ci-
vility in Germany and France).
33 See, for example, Leviticus 19:17 (King James Version) ("Thou shalt not hate thy
brother in thine heart.'); Matthew 5:44 ("But I say unto you, Love your enemies, bless them that
curse you, do good to them that hate you, and pray for them which despitefully use you, and
persecute you."); Luke 6:27-36 (Sermon on the Plain).
34 See, for example, 3 Sgfer haHinnuch: The Book of [Mitzvah] Education 79 (Feldkeim
1984) (Charles Wengrov, trans) (authorship ascribed to Rabbi Pinhas HaLevi of Barcelona)
("On the hatred of wicked people, though, there is no prohibition; it is rather a religious duty to
hate them after we reprove them many times about their sins and they yet do not wish to retract
them."); Leviticus 20:6 ("I will even set my face against that soul, and will cut him off from
among his people."); Psalms 5:4-6 ("For thou art not a God that hath pleasure in wickedness:
neither shall evil dwell with thee. The foolish shall not stand thy sight: thou hatest all workers of
iniquity. Thou shalt destroy them that speak leasing; the Lord will abhor the bloody and deceit-
ful man."); Psalms 139:19-22 ("Surely thou wilt slay the wicked, 0 God: depart from me, there-
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be no question that most people regard as a significant liberty their
right to opt into or out of those traditions-their ability to identify as
they see fit their friends and enemies, their loves and hatreds, and
above all their power to choose the partners with whom they enter
into transactions of all kinds. The harder ethical problems arise when
enmities are expressed in ways that go beyond choosing partners-
the ethics of self-help measures taken to vindicate an affronted sense
of corrective justice.
Those also turn out to be problematic matters from an economic
standpoint that recognizes threats of retaliation of various sorts as
serving important practical purposes. Enmity and the desire to avoid
it are examples. They are powerful enforcers of the norms that govern
most everyday behavior. They are cheap and effective alternatives to
legal ordering and legal sanctions. But the various forms of private re-
taliation that enmity can generate vary considerably in their associ-
ated economic as well as ethical risks. We therefore find that the ex-
pression of enmity is regulated not only by law but by second-order
norms that govern the type of retaliation considered permissible in
reply to a breach of first-order norms. Enmity can be expressed in
ways that are useful and limited in the costs they are likely to create.
But it may also be expressed in ways that have awesome destructive
potential. Second-order norms attempt to confine the expression of
enmity to the former varieties-which also are the least bothersome
from an ethical standpoint. One example of such a norm is that in-
formal sanctions should be kept in proportion to the offenses that
provoke them.3
Another common norm, more important for our purposes, is a
rough distinction between passive and active sanctions for a breach.
Active retaliatory measures-physical abuse, putting up a spite fence,
or otherwise incurring significant out-of-pocket costs to make some-
one else worse off-are regarded as controversial in most civilized
communities, and understandably so on a consequentialist view. They
may give rise to other active and destructive responses, which can es-
fore, ye bloody men. For they speak against thee wickedly, and thine enemies take thy name in
vain. Do I not hate them, 0 Lord, that hate thee? and am I not grieved with those that rise up
against thee? I hate them with perfect hatred: I count them mine enemies"); Proverbs 22:24-25
("Make no friendship with an angry man; and with a furious man thou shalt not go: Lest thou
learn his ways and get a snare to thy soul."); Matthew 18:21-35 (parable of the unforgiving ser-
vant); Matthew 7:21-23 (only those who do the will of God will enter the kingdom of heaven);
Matthew 12:31-32 (blasphemy against the Holy Spirit shall not be forgiven); Luke 16:19-31
(parable of the rich man and Lazarus); The Analects of Confucius 205 (Bradford & Dickens
1956) (Arthur Waley, trans) ("Friendship with the obsequious, friendship with those who are
good at accommodating their principles, friendship with those who are clever at talk is harm-
ful.").
35 See Ellickson, Order without Law at 57-60,72-76,79-81,207-29 (cited in note 19) (dis-
cussing the role of norms in resolving cattle-trespass disputes).
2002]
The University of Chicago Law Review
calate into a larger scale feud. They can be (and sometimes are) used
in measured, carefully calibrated ways, but I would suggest that the
tendency as communities increase in density seems to be away from
them.3 Passive retaliatory measures, however, generally are under-
stood to be well within one's rights-refusing to deal, declining to
help, or otherwise either refusing to incur costs in order to help some-
one or suffering opportunity costs in order to make someone worse
off. Again, the sense of the distinction seems to be keyed to the de-
structive potential involved. If passive measures are reciprocated,
they soon are likely to bottom out in an unfortunate but manageable
state of affairs where neighbors or partners simply are not speaking
or dealing with each other. This has real costs, but their ability to esca-
late is limited. They can be no larger than the lost surpluses from bar-
gains that the parties have forgone. The escalation of active measures
is not likewise limited. It always is possible to spend an additional dol-
lar to make someone else miserable.
The utility of passive sanctions is best illustrated by a return to
the basic right not to transact as a sanction for a breach of some norm.
Suppose one trading partner decides not to make any more contracts
with another who has shown that he does not keep his promises. The
decision may be experienced by either or both parties as an expres-
sion of enmity. Regardless, the ability to make such a decision is im-
portant to the promotion of efficiency as well as autonomy. No doubt
it often is more important than the threat of a lawsuit in persuading
parties to keep their promises. Making enemies generally is bad busi-
ness, and this simple principle typically is responsible for a large share
of the economic and social order any community enjoys. When an
economist predicts that the "market will take care of" some problem,
this is part of what is meant: the behavior we want to secure will be
produced by private decisions, including private decisions to avoid
behavior that will make trading partners mad and so redound to the
actor's own detriment.
We also can think of the enmity and the passive retaliation it may
motivate as a sanction for a perceived defection in a cooperative
game. Many of the norms in any community are likely to give rise to
the usual iterated prisoner's dilemmas. Everyone is better off if eve-
ryone cooperates with the norms than if no one does, but given that
others are cooperating it may be in the immediate self-interest of
each to defect. Then one of the neighbors defects, or so the others
come to believe. Norms require that retaliatory measures of some sort
must follow. Robert Axelrod's famous game theoretical study of co-
operation concludes that "tit-for-tat" - the strategy of starting with
36 For examples from rural Shasta County and the Old West, see id at 57-59.
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cooperation, and then doing whatever the other player did on his pre-
vious move-generally is the optimal, welfare-maximizing strategy for
rational players of games of this sort. A suitable punishment for a
neighbor who breaches one norm of neighborliness thus is a propor-
tional departure from the same norm, or a different one, by others.
One form of retaliatory breach is an abandonment of the usual norm
favoring resolution of conflict through talk, compromise, and bargain-
ing.
With some difficulty one can try to reverse-engineer the behav-
iors of the parties to the nuisance cases described earlier to determine
what strategy they impliedly must have been pursuing in arriving at
their acrimonious positions. It may be that they were playing tit-for-
tat, but badly. Tit-for-tat works well if both sides have the same defini-
tion of what counts as defection and implement it accurately. Since it
is a "nice" strategy in which neither side will be the first to defect,n
there will be no willing defections at all if both sides stick to it. But
the strategy is sensitive to mistakes, and produces unhappy results if
either side errs in assessing the behavior of the other. A behavior mis-
takenly believed to be a defection results in a retaliatory defection,
which may result in another retaliatory defection in kind, and so forth
ad infinitum." Each actor becomes convinced that the other is unrea-
sonable and perhaps unethical, neither wants to deal with the other,
and the rounds of retaliation take on a life of their own. (Another
possibility is that at least one of the parties is playing a strategy dif-
ferent from tit-for-tat altogether, for example, the one-strike rule: if
the other side ever defects, then always defect.) Any of these stories
seems consistent with the nuisance cases, which by their end had gen-
erally descended by one path or another into impassable hostilities.
The only necessary point here is that retaliation and the threat of it,
even when it leads to an uncooperative stalemate, can serve a useful
purpose in the enforcement of cooperative norms. And in a well-
functioning community we might well expect nevertheless to see in-
stances where mistakes-perhaps even reasonable mistakes-have
the ultimate consequence of ending all dealings between the parties,
or where the same result is reached not by mistake but by an unfortu-
nate collision of incompatible interests.
It might seem odd to use the language of game theory to discuss
behavior that seems to have a significant emotional component. The
accounts in the prior article of the enmities that can characterize nui-
37 See Robert Axelrod, The Evolution of Cooperation 122-23 (Basic 1984) (explaining the
success of tit-for-tat as a strategy in iterated games).
38 See id at 113-17 (discussing the benefits of not defecting first).
39 See Ellickson, Order without Law at 227 (cited in note 19) ("[A] single error may lead
to an endless echo of reprisals.").
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sance litigation do not sound like accounts of strategic choice. But the
emotional basis of some enmity and retaliation on the one hand, and
the usefulness of those things on the other, have to be considered in
light of one another. The emotional impulse for retribution is a means
by which the strategic benefits of retaliation are gained. I do not mean
to claim that the emotional impulse exists in order to make humans
more effective strategic players;40 that may or may not be the case. But
as a practical matter there are benefits to following tit-for-tat or other
strategies of retaliating against defections in many walks of life, and
the emotionally rooted desire to have revenge conveniently imple-
ments that strategy without the need for calculation or conscious re-
41
solve. The aggrieved party need not measure out units of obstinacy
as a sanction for his adversary's offensive acts or bad manners. All he
may know, and all he needs to know, is that his adversary has suc-
ceeded in getting his goat and that he therefore is inclined to take a
harder line with him from now on.
The fact that useful retaliation frequently is prompted by emo-
tion creates some difficulties, since it can be hard to keep the emotion
coextensive with its underlying justification. The emotional impulse to
retaliate may be triggered too easily and may be hard to turn off. A
drastic refusal to bargain with an adversary after litigation may be an
example of such an instance in which the emotions behind retributiv-
ism are outliving their actual usefulness. But not necessarily. As
Robert Frank has argued, an advantage in being an emotionally re-
tributive sort of person lies precisely in the promise that when
crossed, I will take punitive measures even if they do not seem to be
in my own self-interest.42 A retributive spirit thus has value as a deter-
rent that may not be replaced effectively by a direct commitment to
deterrence. Sometimes the best deterrence is an indifference to deter-
rence as an explicit concern. Fear of emotional reactions and behav-
iors by neighbors is likely to be a more effective deterrent against dis-
courtesy than fear that the neighbor is an economist who may
(though then again may not) determine that the discourtesy is worthy
of a sanction in response. One way to achieve these good deterrent
results is to pretend to be a hothead, but another is to be a hothead.
The emotional root of much enmity and retaliation can further
be understood as usefully securing the provision of a public good, for
the infuriated neighbor may be doing others a favor at his own ex-
pense. If he refuses to bargain out of a sense of indignation, from at
40 On the perils of facile assumptions of this sort, see Elster, Sour Grapes at 101-08 (cited
in note 7).
41 See Robert H. Frank, Passions within Reason: The Strategic Role of the Emotions 29-37
(Norton 1988) (describing the success of tit-for-tat retaliation in strategic games).
42 Id (explaining why tit-for-tat retaliation leads quickly to strategic cooperation).
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least one perspective he is hurting himself as well as his enemy. By as-
sumption, the bargains lost would have made them both better off if
they had been on good terms. But the wrongdoer, and other potential
wrongdoers, may learn a lesson from the experience and behave bet-
ter next time. Others will benefit from this, regardless of whether the
party who imposes the sanction does. He may just be taking part in
the maintenance of a cultural practice that, like throwing away trash
rather than leaving it on the ground, has great value in general but
puny benefits to him on any given occasion. It may be better in gen-
eral for everyone, though not necessarily good for you, if you overre-
act to the misbehavior of others, and the emotional root of such over-
reactions helps ensure that they will occur. Hence Frank's view that
emotions help to solve otherwise difficult cooperation games.
Note that the consequences of the enmities involved in litigation
and bargaining afterwards can be particularly significant because they
may arise in circumstances in which there is no market to which the
parties can turn for relief from their hostilities. One reason passive re-
fusals to deal often cause quite limited harm is that the parties can
find second-best trading partners elsewhere. But the aggrieved plain-
tiff and defendant in a nuisance dispute often cannot turn away from
each other and make substitute deals with others. One side has the
rights that the other side wants, and nobody else does. Moving away
usually is a possibility for one party or the other in such settings, but
that tends to be a very costly measure. As a practical matter a refusal
to bargain thus may have more severe consequences after a nuisance
case ends-or after the end of any case where the parties are locked
in with each other-than it usually will in an ordinary commercial set-
ting. When the parties are locked into a bilateral monopoly, all of the
potential surplus from trade between them may be lost.
A purpose of this discussion has been to destabilize the common
intuition that enmity necessarily is a bad thing. By way of summary,
let us draw some distinctions between the various standpoints from
which enmity can be viewed. It is possible to think of enmity just as a
type of taste, and to consider the power to indulge it-particularly in
selecting trading partners-an aspect of a person's autonomy pre-
sumptively entitled to respect. On this liberal view the right to give ef-
fect to enmities after judgment might be constrained only by whether
the community at large has, for whatever reason, deemed the particu-
lar type of enmity (for example, racial enmity) an unacceptable basis
for the exercise of autonomy. Enmities also can be viewed from a
moral perspective, approved or disapproved individually according to
whether they comport with a given ethical view or with the under-
standings of the community or its representatives. Some enmities, ap-
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propriately expressed, are quite consistent with leading moral and
ethical traditions; others are not.
From an economic or utilitarian standpoint enmity likewise is
ambiguous. Actions motivated by it may make its holder feel good,
but often will not make others better off, and may make them worse
off. On the other hand, the risk of creating enmity provides an incen-
tive for people to avoid breaching norms, and the threat that enmity
will result from such breaches is made credible by people who are
moved to impose sanctions because of it. Enmity and the retribution
it motivates may indeed be worthy of praise, in the same way one can
praise a well-drawn set of criminal sanctions while regretting the oc-
casions for its use. Of course some enmities do not serve this useful
purpose. In this sense it may be possible to distinguish between
"good" and "bad" enmities from a utilitarian as well as from a moral
perspective, which commonly will overlap.
An important issue separate from the goodness or badness of an
enmity is the way it is expressed. Acts motivated by enmity can re-
duce immediate welfare while at the same time serving a normal and
healthy purpose in sustaining a web of welfare-maximizing norms.
Passive sanctions-opportunity costs incurred out of enmity-tend to
serve those useful norm-reinforcing purposes while minimizing the
welfare losses associated with the behavior enmity can motivate. Ac-
tive sanctions-out-of-pocket expenditures to make someone else
worse off-have a greater potential to provoke escalation and feud-
ing, thus making the welfare-reducing aspect of enmity more promi-
nent and costly and also multiplying the number of acts that provoke
additional enmities.
The normative difference between active and passive sanctions
also can be understood by reference to the different appetites for sat-
isfaction that enmity can generate. Some behaviors motivated by en-
mity are satisfying to those who engage in them just because they re-
duce the welfare of someone else. This is the most repellent side of
enmity, and it is especially likely to be the case where one person ac-
tively spends resources to make another person worse off-that is,
where the sanctions are active in the sense described above. Yet en-
mity also can cause people not to revel in the suffering of the others
who are the object of it, but just to shun them on principle-to decline
to transact with them. These passive expressions of enmity tend to be
far less ethically or economically objectionable, and may indeed be
meritorious on both grounds.
IV. LEGAL REGULATION OF ENMITY
We have seen that enmity and its expression are regulated in part
by norms, but they are also regulated by law. What can we learn from
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the law's treatment of enmity elsewhere? Here again we find that
enmity has an ambiguous status, but one generally consistent with the
perspectives on enmity considered in the previous section. Some pos-
sible generalizations, with examples and comments, are these:
1. Torts and crimes often are punished more heavily when
motivated by enmity.
A deliberately destroys B's property. A is subject to a criminal
penalty. If the motive for the destruction was enmity toward the
property owner, A may be subject to an increased penalty. The
increased penalty does not depend on whether A knew the iden-
tity of the property owner, but it does require that A was hostile
toward the owner, whoever that was.43
A sells a house to B, and deliberately conceals the fact that the
well behind the house has insufficient access to water. A is liable
to B for compensatory damages-that is, the difference between
what B paid for the house and its actual value. But A is liable to
B for additional sums-punitive damages-if the motive for A's
fraud was enmity toward B.-
Why does the law make a point of punishing enmity when it mo-
tivates acts already prohibited in themselves? Perhaps it is because
people motivated by enmity are felt to be morally worse than those
who violate others' rights out of economic desperation or for other
impersonal reasons. Another possibility, however, is that wrongs moti-
vated by enmity are more likely than random wrongs to provoke a
felt need for private retaliation if no extra sanction is awarded. A per-
son who attacks another randomly is unlikely, if he commits another
attack, to go after the same person, whereas one who attacks another
out of personal enmity is much more likely to single him out again
later (or again to single out a member of his group, if the enmity was
against a class rather than against an individual); evidently not just
any victim will do. We therefore might expect to find that the human
appetite for revenge, whether it takes the form of "teaching a lesson"
to a wrongdoer or discharging the impulse to "get even" with him,
seems most vigorous when a wrongdoer's initial act was motivated by
enmity. The need for the victim to retaliate in order to deter more at-
tacks-and thus the possibility of a feud characterized by escalating
43 See Massachusetts Model Jury Instructions for Use in the District Court § 5.301 (Admin
Office of Dist Ct 1988 & Supp 1989) (enumerating elements of willful and malicious destruction
of property: (1) defendant injured or destroyed the property and (2) defendant did so willfully
and with malice).
44 See, for example, Waters v Novak, 94 Ohio App 347,115 NE2d 420,422 (1953.).
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lawlessness-is greatest then. Nor should it be surprising that the law
provides punitive damages on such occasions, and that courts some-
times have recognized the role that punitive damages play as "a sub-
stitute for personal revenge by the wronged party."' It is true that oc-
casionally enmity can help to reduce the severity of a criminal sanc-
tion, as when the killer of his wife's paramour is found guilty of man-
slaughter rather than murder.4 But the reduction in that case seems
critically keyed not to the enmity at play in the situation but to the
high level of uncontrollable emotion that may be thought involved in
it, for when the emotion recedes, the enmity no longer serves as a de-
fense.
2. Affirmative acts not otherwise considered wrongful
sometimes are punished when motivated by enmity.
A is a neighbor of B. A builds a fence along their property line
that he knows will annoy B. The fence does not affect the market
value of either party's property. If A was motivated by enmity in
building the fence, he is liable to B and must remove it. If A was
not motivated by enmity, he is not liable to B and may retain the
fence.'7
A buys a horse from B, and concludes that the horse contains a
defect. At a seminar on the breeding of horses, A publicly de-
clares that B sold him a defective horse. In fact the horse was not
defective. A's statement nevertheless is privileged as a matter of
"common interest." But A is liable to B for defamation if he was
motivated in making the statement by enmity toward B.4'
It is unusual but not unheard of for the law to treat an act not
otherwise wrongful as wrongful when it is motivated by enmity. There
is a popular maxim from Cooley that "[m]alicious motives make a bad
45 Kemezy v Peters, 79 F3d 33,35 (7th Cir 1996); Perry v Melton, 171 W Va 397,299 SE2d
8,13 (1982); Kessel v Leavitt, 204 W Va 95,511 SE2d 720,816 (W Va App 1998); Woodard v City
Stores Co, 334 A2d 189,191 (DC App 1975).
46 See Wayne R. LaFave & Austin W. Scott, Jr., 2 Substantive Criminal Law § 7.10(b)(5) at
258-60 (West 2d ed 1986); State v Thornton, 730 SW2d 309, 315 (Tenn 1987) (setting aside a
murder conviction for a man who killed his wife's lover upon finding them in flagrante delicto);
Vaughn v Commonwealth, 204 Ky 229,263 SW 752,755 (1924); Haley v State, 123 Miss 87, 85 S
129,131 (1920); Whidden v State, 64 Fla 165,59 S 561,561 (1912). See also William Blackstone, 2
Commentaries on the Laws of England *191-92 (Chicago 1979).
47 See generally Deborah Tussey, Annotation, Fence as Nuisance, 80 ALR3d 962, 965
(1977). For examples of the rules courts have devised to resolve these questions, see Larkin v
Tsavaris, 85 S2d 731 (Fla 1956); Hornsby v Smith, 191 Ga 491,13 SE2d 20 (1941).
48 Lundquist v Reusser, 7 Cal 4th 1193, 875 P2d 1279, 1279 (1994) ("[A] defendant who
makes a statement to others on a matter of common interest is immunized from liability from
defamation so long as the statement is made 'without malice."'), quoting Cal Civ Code § 47(c)
(1994).
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act worse, but they cannot make that a wrong which in its own essence
is lawful,'' but that formulation is too strong to capture the rules the
courts in fact have created. Liability for the erection of a spite fence is
an example of a departure from Cooley's view in jurisdictions that
provide for it (not all do). The liability is understandable from a con-
sequentialist standpoint, because the building of the fence is an out-
of-pocket provocation between neighbors who are locked into close
relations, and where a feud therefore has more than the usual likeli-
hood of eruption and destructive potential. Naturally, the administra-
tive cost of identifying true spite fences and separating them from the
look-alikes may be considerable. The tradeoff between that burden
and the benefit of keeping the lid on a feud is a difficult one, so it is
not surprising that courts vary in their handling of it.
The malicious supply of a false and damaging reference is a re-
lated example, and is based on the same general principle as the case
of the defective horse described above. In such cases one party makes
another worse off with conduct-making statements of "common in-
terest" -ordinarily considered privileged. The privilege serves the
useful purpose of facilitating the transmission of valuable informa-
tion. A showing that the statements were motivated by enmity creates
liability because it dissolves the premise of the privilege, suggesting
that the acts were not furthering a useful purpose after all. The law in
these cases is not quite punishing enmity per se. It is punishing the in-
fliction of harm because enmity has vitiated the usual excuse for it.
Even the most resilient privileges, such as the constitutional maxim
that truth is an absolute defense to a defamation claim, have been
known to be set aside by courts in private circumstances where a
damaging true utterance is motivated by enmity.n Apart from whether
the holdings of such cases reflect sound understandings of the First
Amendment," they illustrate the strength of the judicial impulse to
find liability where someone goes to trouble and expense to make an-
other worse off
Some jurisdictions go still further, recognizing a creature known
as a "prima facie tort" that consists of any otherwise lawful act en-
gaged in just to injure another. This strand of law had its beginnings
49 Thomas M. Cooley, A Treatise on the Law of Torts or The Wrongs Which Arise Inde-
pendent of Contract 690 (Callaghan & Co 1879). See also Hadley v Southwest Properties, Inc,
116 Ariz 503,570 P2d 190,193 (1977); Krause v Hartford Accident & Indemnity Co, 331 Mich 19,
49 NW2d 41,44 (1951);Johnson vAetna Life Insurance Co, 158 Wis 56,147 NW 32,33 (1914).
5o See, for example, Johnson v Johnson, 654 A2d 1212, 1215-16 (RI 1995) (holding that
truth is not a defense when private libel is uttered maliciously); People v Heinrich, 104 IMI 2d
137,470 NE2d 966,970 (1984) (similar).
51 See Garrison v Louisiana, 379 US 64,72 n 8 (1964) (reserving the question of constitu-
tional protection of private libel).
52 See Kenneth J. Vandevelde, The Modern Prima Facie Tort Doctrine, 79 Ky L J 519,538
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in Holmes's remark that "prima facie, the intentional infliction of
temporal damage is a cause of action, which, as a matter of substan-
tive law, whatever may be the form of pleading, requires a justification
if the defendant is to escape. '5 3 In most jurisdictions that recognize the
prima facie tort doctrine, it may mean little more than that courts
have the power to identify intentional, harmful conduct as tortious
even if they cannot fit the conduct into an existing pigeonhole of tort
law. As such, it is just a way of recognizing the courts' ability to create
new torts as new social conditions require. While a showing of mali-
cious motive is relevant, it is neither necessary nor sufficient to war-
rant this use of the doctrine." A few other courts, however, have un-
derstood the doctrine differently, regarding it as creating liability just
for intentional acts motivated by "disinterested malevolence" - any
acts, in other words, that make another worse off and are done solely
for that purpose.M A curious and entertaining feature of the doctrine
is that it does not apply if the actor's motives included any ingredient
other than enmity; if he was motivated mostly by enmity but also by a
dash of self-interest, there is no tort. 7
New York has been the leader in advancing the doctrine just de-
scribed, but perhaps the most vivid example is the Illinois case of
Pendleton v Time, Inc." The plaintiff was an artist who claimed to have
painted the first portrait of President Truman. When Life magazine
was unable to negotiate with him for the right to reproduce his work,
the magazine published a different portrait of Truman and claimed
(1991) (stating that some courts find a prima facie tort where a lawful act is done solely out of
malice or ill will); Annotation, Prima Facie Tort, 16 ALR3d 1191, 1194 (1967) (collecting cases
that discuss "the existence and nature of the cause of action for 'prima facie tort').
53 Aikens v Wisconsin, 195 US 194,204 (1904). See also Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr., Privi-
lege, Malice, and Intent, 8 Harv L Rev 1, 3 (1894) ("[T]he intentional infliction of temporal dam-
age ... is actionable if done without just cause.").
54 See Clark v Associated Retail Credit Men of Washington, DC, 105 F2d 62, 64 (DC Cir
1939) (recognizing that a court may fill "'open spaces' in the law of [its] jurisdiction" in light of
"social interests").
55 See Vandevelde, 79 Ky L J at 535 (cited in note 52) ("Malice is neither necessary nor in
all cases sufficient for a finding that the defendant's conduct was not justified."); Restatement
(Second) of Torts § 870 (ALI 1979) ("One who intentionally causes injury to another is subject
to liability ... if his conduct is generally culpable and not justifiable.").
56 See, for example, Marcella v ARP Films, 778 F2d 112 (2d Cir 1987); Miller v
Geloda/Briarwood Corp, 136 Misc 2d 155 (Sup Ct NY 1986), 518 NYS2d 340,342 (1987); Squire
Records, Inc v Vanguard Recording Society, Inc, 25 AD2d 190,268 NYS2d 251,254 (1966).
57 See Marcella, 778 F2d at 119 ("[T]he sole motivation for the damaging acts must have
been a malicious intention to injure.... When there are other motives ... there is no ... prima
facie tort."); Miller, 518 NYS2d at 342 (holding that the plaintiff failed to assert a prima facie
tort claim because the defendant's actions were not motivated solely by malice); Squire Records,
268 NYS2d at 253-54 (holding that a prima facie tort only sounds where "the sole motivation
for the damaging acts hafs] been a malicious intention to injure").
58 See note 56.
59 339 Ill App 188,89 NE2d 435 (1949).
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that it was the first ever painted of him. The plaintiff alleged that the
magazine made this claim solely to spite him by reducing the value of
his work. The court held that the plaintiff had a property right in the
value of his portrait and that he had stated a good claim for the inten-
tional destruction of it: "When, as alleged in the complaint, this injury
to plaintiff's property right was willfully, maliciously and intentionally
committed by defendant, there must be a remedy afforded for this
wrong to the plaintiff." 6 Pendleton can be understood as a case of mis-
taken legal identity by the court; perhaps it would have been better
treated as an instance of indirect commercial disparagement. But the
case has sometimes been considered as well a seminal instance of a
prima facie tort-a case where an otherwise lawful act became unlaw-
ful just because of the motive behind it.6 Pendleton is an odd case, and
it involves a doctrine that might fairly be considered trivial because it
covers few fact patterns. It is unusual for a significantly harmful act
done solely out of malice to be otherwise lawful. The case, along with
much of the prima facie tort doctrine and especially the judicial
rhetoric that accompanies it, nevertheless illustrates again the persis-
tent tendency of the common law to seek ways to punish enmity when
it motivates out-of-pocket expenditures to make others worse off.
3. Enmity does not make a failure to act-an incurring of
opportunity costs-culpable, unless the enmity is of a
particular variety that collectively has been deemed an
unacceptable basis for decision.
A is the employer of B. They have no formal employment con-
tract; B is an at-will employee. A fires B, and in doing so is moti-
vated by enmity toward B. A is not liable to B.6'
C, an outsider to the at-will relationship between A and B, suc-
cessfully importunes A to fire B. If C was motivated by personal
enmity toward B, C is liable to B.A
60 Id at 438.
61 See Kerry A. McHugh, Product Disparagement: Expanding Liability in Texas, 41 Sw L J
1203,1242 n 40 (1988) (citing Pendleton as an example of a disparagement case).
62 See Vandevelde, 79 Ky L J at 555 n 36 (cited in note 52) (citing Pendleton as an instance
of the prima facie tort doctrine); Madelyn C. Squire, The Prima Facie Tort Doctrine and a Social
Justice Theory: Are They a Response to the Employment At-Will Rule?, 51 U Pitt L Rev 641,664
n 98 (1990) (same).
63 E.I. DuPont de Nemours & Co v Pressman, 679 A2d 436,444 (Del 1996) (holding that
malice is insufficient to create a cause of action for termination of an at-wil employee); White v
Ardan, InG 239 Neb 11,430 NW2d 27,30 (1988) (same); Fawcett v G.C Murphy & Co, 46 Ohio
St 2d 245,348 NE2d 144,147 (1976) (same).
64 Nordling v Northern States Power Co, 478 NW2d 498, 505 (Minn 1991) (finding third-
party liability for interference with an at-will employment relationship); Toney v Casey's Gen-
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A declines to hire B for a position because of A's enmity toward
members of B's race. A is liable to B.
These results might be understood to trace the line between ac-
tive and passive expressions of enmity-or more precisely between
opportunity costs (discontinuing employment) and out-of-pocket
costs (importuning an employer to discontinue employment) incurred
to express it. The absorption of opportunity costs rarely is a basis for
liability. The exception is the discrimination case where the enmity
has been broadly forbidden as a basis even for a decision to forgo a
transaction; but ordinary personal enmity remains a satisfactory basis
for dismissal from at-will employment. Part of the reason may be that
the parties to such enmities usually do not have the high barriers to
escape experienced by a neighbor confronted with a spite fence. In a
well-functioning job market the costs of dismissal on account of en-
mity usually are not all that high. But this cannot be the whole story,
because while dismissing an at-will employee out of spite is legally
permissible, successfully agitating for his dismissal out of spite is a
tort:
In determining whether the interference (with another's em-
ployment) is improper, it may become very important to ascer-
tain whether the actor was motivated, in whole or in part, by a
desire to interfere with the other's contractual relations. If this
was the sole motive the interference is almost certain to be held
improper. A motive to injure another or to vent one's ill will on
him serves no socially useful purpose.6'
Why does this rule not apply to employers themselves? The dis-
tinction might be explained by the difficulty of separating cases of il-
legitimate animus from those where the employer is exercising his le-
gitimate right to get rid of employees because they are incompetent
or difficult to deal with. When a busybody ruins someone else's at-will
employment relationship, he has no comparable legitimate interests
that we worry about infringing. Or the difference might be explained
by the impracticality of requiring the employer to retain an employee
he detests, a state of affairs which can be costly for others not parties
to their relationship6-and again may not be a problem if the em-
ployer retains an employee whom an outsider detests. But the distinc-
tion may also reflect a general lack of concern for the spectacle of an
eral Stores, Inc, 460 NW2d 849, 851 (Iowa 1990) (same); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766
comment g (discussing interference by a third party with an at-will employment contract).
65 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 comment d.
66 See Avitia v Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc, 49 F3d 1219, 1231 (7th Cir 1995) (re-
viewing the harm that may be inflicted on workers and consumers when reinstatement or other
equitable remedies are imposed on employers).
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employer ceasing to carry an employee he hates, while also a height-
ened sense of worry about the third party who goes out of his way to
make the employee worse off and so may provoke active gestures of
retaliation. If strikes undertaken on a tit-for-tat basis so turn active
rather than passive, it may be hard to prevent them from veering into
escalating rounds of tortious or criminal misconduct.
4. Enmity is disregarded in situations where the behavior it
motivates has positive social consequences.
A opens a business that competes with B's firm. A's firm is a big
success, and ultimately drives B's out of business. A was moti-
vated solely by enmity toward B. A is not liable to B. 7
A makes defamatory public statements about B, a public figure,
regarding matters of public concern. The statements are false, but
A is not aware of this and was not reckless regarding this possi-
bility. A is motivated in making the statements by enmity toward
B. A is not liable to B.'s
These examples can be understood as cases where the acts in-
volved create large social benefits. Speech about public figures con-
tributes to public deliberation, and competition contributes to con-
sumer welfare. The law therefore is indifferent to whether enmity mo-
tivates these acts. Courts in antitrust cases have made clear that ill will
is not relevant to the question of "antitrust intent";0 it is to be ex-
pected that competitors will detest each other since their interests
conflict, and indeed this may be a good thing if the enmity causes
67 See Olympia Equipment Leasing Co v Western Union Telegraph Co, 797 F2d 370,379
(7th Cir 1986):
[I]f conduct is not objectively anticompetitive the fact that it was motivated by hostility to
competitors ("these turkeys") is irrelevant.... Competition, which is always deliberate, has
never been a tort, intentional or otherwise. See Keeble v. Hickeringill, 11 East. 574, 103
Eng. Rep. 1127 (K.B. 1706 or 1707). If firm A through lower prices or a better or more de-
pendable product succeeds in driving competitor B out of business, society is better off;
unlike the case where A and B are individuals and A kills B for B's money. In both cases
the "aggressor" seeks to transfer his victim's wealth to himselt but in the first case we ap-
plaud the result because society as a whole benefits from the competitive process ... Most
businessmen don't like their competitors, or for that matter competition. They want to
make as much money as possible and getting a monopoly is one way of making a lot of
money. That is fine, however, so long as they do not use methods calculated to make con-
sumers worse off in the long run.
65 See Batson v Shiflett, 325 Md 684, 602 A2d 1191, 1213 (1992) (acknowledging that a
defamation claim requires a defendant to make the statement at issue "'with knowledge that it
was false or with reckless disregard' as to its truth or falsity), quoting New York Times Co v Sul-
livan, 376 US 254,279-80 (1964).
69 See Olympia Equipment Leasing, 797 F2d at 379 (suggesting that ill will in the antitrust
context can spur competition that benefits society).
2002]
The University of Chicago Law Review
them to compete more ferociously. The attention of the law thus turns
to the propriety of the defendant's behavior, and not to whether he is
acting out of ill will toward the plaintiff.
The pattern that emerges from these sets of examples roughly
tracks the logic of the norms proposed and discussed in the previous
section. When an actor decides to express enmity by going outside the
law and committing a fraud or an act of violence, this is the stuff feuds
and cycles of revenge are made of; if a tit-for-tat strategy is followed,
it will lead to more lawlessness. The law accordingly punishes the law-
breaker motivated by enmity more heavily than it otherwise would.
When an actor expresses enmity through means that involve no law-
breaking but do involve out-of-pocket expenditures to make another
unhappy, the law is ambivalent. It often will try to find a way to penal-
ize and discourage this, though there are limits on how far it can go as
a practical matter.
But the law generally lets people express their enmities pas-
sively-by incurring opportunity costs-all they like, unless the enmi-
ties can be classified easily and decisively as distinctively offensive to
public policy. And the law recognizes that enmities sometimes serve
such good purposes in stimulating the provision of good things. In
those cases, the courts are careful not to penalize enmity. This is not
the result we would expect if enmity per se were considered a morally
offensive reason for action. It is the result we would expect if enmity
were considered problematic because of the consequences it often,
but not always, produces when it motivates behavior.
V. ENMITY IN POST-JUDGMENT BARGAINING
A. Uncertainties
Having examined some conditional defenses of enmity and ex-
amples of its treatment elsewhere in the law, it is time now to assess
how it should be handled in areas where it may complicate bargaining
after judgment. We can imagine several stylized approaches to the
question.
From a brutally utilitarian standpoint, enmity of any type and
from any origin is just another preference and potential source of sat-
isfaction." If we set aside the problem of how to measure enmity, we
can imagine a case on those grounds for trying to get rights into the
hands of whoever values them the most even if the source of the
valuation is gratified enmity. If we wanted to go that far, the case for
property rights in situations dominated by enmity might be simple
70 See J.J.C. Smart, An Outline of a System of Utilitarian Ethics, in J.J.C. Smart and Ber-
nard Williams, eds, Utilitarianism: For and Against 3, 26 (Cambridge 1973) ("[T]here are no
pleasures which are intrinsically bad.").
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and overpowering, just as it tends to be strong in any other case where
subjective values run high.' Nobody is likely to want to go that far,
however, because the prospect of treating all preferences as valuable,
no matter how odious, is ethically unappealing and has potentially un-
savory consequences. The difficulty, as we have seen, is that there are
bad enmities and good, enmities that should be credited and others
that, all else equal, we might prefer to see the law override or treat as
transaction costs, if it feasibly can. This makes it hard to embrace en-
mity comfortably as always just another preference.
An alternative at the other extreme is to regard all enmities as
bad,.7 and to say that the only other-regarding preferences the law
ought to be prepared to respect are the altruistic preferences. If en-
mity of any type is found to be a common impediment to bargaining
in a class of cases, then on this view those are indeed cases of high
transaction costs where damages are warranted.7 This may seem a
more attractive normative basis for decision than the idea that every
enmity is just a preference entitled to the same recognition as any
other. But the altruism-only approach should be rejected as well, and
for the same reason. Depending on its origin and expression, an en-
mity can be both socially useful and an important expression of its
holder's autonomy. Enmity is a marvelous study in the complexity of
human preferences precisely because it is so ambiguous-so capable
of being enormously justified or enormously unjustified. That dual po-
71 See Cass R. Sunstein, Incommensurability and Valuation in Law, 92 Mich L Rev 779,
843-44 (1994) (suggesting that when subjective values are high the case for specific perform-
ance is strong); Thomas S. Ulen, The Efficiency of Specific Performance: Toward a Unified The-
ory of Contract Remedies, 83 Mich L Rev 341, 365 (1984) ("[S]pecific performance offers the
most efficient mechanism for protecting subjective values attached to performance.").
72 See, for example, Matthew D. Adler and Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit
Analysis when Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J Legal Stud 1105, 1121-22, 1131-33 (2000) (dis-
cussing how government agencies correct for objectively bad preferences in performing cost-
benefit analyses); John C. Harsanyi, Problems with Act-Utilitarianism and with Malevolent Pref-
erences, in Douglas Seanor and N. Fotion, eds, Hare and Critics: Essays on Moral Thinking 89,
96-99 (Clarendon 1988) (arguing that antisocial preferences should be given no weight); Robert
E. Goodin, Laundering Preferences, in Jon Elster and Aanund Hylland, eds, Foundations of So-
cial Choice Theory 75,75 (Cambridge 1986) (acknowledging that some preferences may be "so
awfully perverse as to forfeit any right to our respect"); Richard A. Posner, The Economics of
Justice 56-58, 65, 82-83 (Harvard 1981) (discussing the "utility monster's" conflict with society's
moral intuitions); Robert Nozick, Anarchy, Stat and Utopia 41 (Basic 1974) (describing the
problem of the "utility monster").
73 See, for example, John C. Harsanyi, Morality and the Theory of Rational Behavior, in
Amartya Sen and Bernard Williams, eds, Utilitarianism and Beyond 39,56 (Cambridge 1991):
A person displaying ill will toward others does remain a member of this community, but
not with his whole personality. That part of his personality that harbours these hostile anti-
social feelings must be excluded from membership, and has no claim for a-hearing when it
comes to defining our concept of social utility.
74 This is the approximate result Eric Posner reaches. See text accompanying notes 91-93.
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tential is as damaging to this second alternative solution as it is to the
first.
Against this it might be argued that an override of acrimonious
preferences by a court is justified if it represents what a party actually
would want-his preferences about his preferences-as measured at
some other moment in time. This is a standard argument for "launder-
ing" preferences: some of them may be offensive to a number of our
multiple selves. But are enmities in this category? It is clear that we
might wish to avoid occasions for them, but whether we would want
to relinquish our ability to give effect to them once circumstances
make them seem appropriate is another matter. The answer might be
obvious if the question was whether we want to strip away our power
to give lawless effect to enmities, for then an affirmative answer might
be inferred from the doctrines considered earlier that punish law-
breaking more heavily when enmity motivates it. Those doctrines re-
flect a judgment taken in advance about how we want enmity to be
dramatized, regardless of what contrary desires we have when the
enmity is our own. But the question here is whether what people
want, most of the time, is to have deals made for them by courts when,
by assumption, they do not want to make deals for themselves for
reasons that seem compelling to them at the time. There is little rea-
son to believe that this is, in fact, what people want. The power to
withhold consent-to express a commodification preference against
bargaining over one's rights, apart from whatever price one would put
on them if forced to do so at an auction-is a significant feature of
human autonomy, and we should not too easily imagine people eager
to forfeit it; likewise the ability to enjoy the moral satisfaction of a
well-earned enmity in the appropriate case. It is all a matter of specu-
lation, and the guesses we make about how much others value their
right to indulge their enmities seem likely to be heavily influenced by
whatever preferences we each hold for ourselves.
If it were possible to generalize accurately about the likelihood
that the enmities that follow judgment or otherwise arise between
litigants usually fall into the good or bad categories, it might be easy
enough to say that one of the two extreme approaches described
above is close enough to correct to be the right one. There is no ap-
parent basis for such a generalization. What about solutions that fall
between these polls, and attempt to split the difference? Regrettably,
irreducible uncertainties similar to those just discussed spoil the pros-
pects of several intermediate solutions that are premised on the idea
75 See Goodin, Utilitarianism as a Public Philosophy at 132-48 (cited in note 23) (defining
self-laundering as a situation in which an individual's preferences offend his personal values).
[69:211
The Economics of Enmity
that enmities can be just or unjust, creditworthy or condemnable, and
that try to untangle them accordingly. Let us consider some examples.
First, if it were possible to know whether and when parties to a
case were justly and unjustly enraged, the argument for damages
rather than property rights as remedies in cases fraught with bad en-
mity might be tempting. But judges do not have the tools to make fac-
tual findings or normative judgments about most of the reasons why
parties might hate each other. The story of a case is presented to a
court in a choreographed fashion orchestrated by lawyers and con-
strained by rules of evidence and time limits. The court renders a deci-
sion against a background of extralegal norms and interactions that
are likely to make the ultimate consequences of its decisions hard to
predict; it typically is contributing a hastily worded paragraph to a
story with a complicated past and perhaps a complicated future, and
with which it is barely familiar on a human level. Aside from the fac-
tual obscurities that frequently surround an enmity's origins and ra-
tionale, there are large problems of normative evaluation as well. A
stylized way to think of the general problem of good and bad enmities
is to imagine a rabbi and a Nazi living side by side, each wanting to
avoid bargaining with the other: the Nazi because of his anti-
Semitism, which the community condemns and does not want to
honor; and the rabbi because of his anti-Nazism, which the commu-
nity endorses and does want to honor. The justness of the rabbi's en-
mity and the unjustness of the Nazi's are clearly visible and are mat-
ters of normative consensus for our hypothetical community. Alas, ex-
amples so clear are quite unusual. In real life, figuring out which side
is which-or whether both sides fall into one category or the other-
tends not to be normatively cut and dried. Litigants get mad at each
other for reasons that typically are bound up not in ideology or phi-
losophy but in matters of temperament, manners, and personal values
that are hard to assess by reference to any ethical metric a judge
might feasibly apply. This normative complexity can be understood as
a large and probably prohibitive measurement cost.
Second, there is the related but slightly different argument that if
a court is sure the parties want to make a deal but just cannot bring
themselves to execute it, then it can do them both a favor by awarding
damages. In that case the court might be giving the parties what they
really want then and there: the result of a deal without the face-losing
ordeal of consenting to it. Some legal interventions can be understood
this way. Imagine a world where parties routinely make trades with
members of their own race, but are forbidden by taboo from trading
with members of other races even when they secretly, or in their bet-
ter natures, wish they could. In these circumstances it is possible that
by awarding damages rather than property rights a court would be
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making a Pareto-optimal adjustment. Its award may in effect strike a
deal for the parties that does make them both better off by helping
them around a custom that has come to serve them poorly. This is one
way to think about the function of Title VII and other antidiscrimina-
tion laws at some times and places. It also is a way of understanding
laws that attempt to overcome dysfunctional norms by changing the
social meaning of an act-such as a law that, in Professor Lessig's ex-
ample, requires the passenger in a cab to fasten a seatbelt, and thus
strips away the risk that the act of fastening it might insult the driver
and thus not be done at all.76 Interventions like these allow the actor
to effect his preference against bargaining, or against delivering an in-
sult, or against being viewed by others as choosing to fraternize with a
member of a despised race. At the same time they give the actor the
result that the fear of those things threatens to prevent-a result he
might like to have if only he did not have to incur such distasteful
process costs.
The difficulty again lies in distinguishing such possibilities from
the case in which, on our facts, the victor in the lawsuit really does not
want an exchange at all: he will be galled by an award of damages just
as he would be by the act of bargaining; in his way of conceptualizing
the dispute, his opponent will be getting away with something unto-
ward if he is able to wriggle out of liability by writing a check. He
wants the rights. If that is how litigants experience their disputes, it is
hard to justify damages on the ground that they give the winner what
he really wants in some meaningful sense. In practice, no doubt, there
are all sorts of litigants and all sorts of ways for them to think and feel
about their disputes, their opponents, and the relationship between
rights and money. If courts were likely to be good at sorting out these
variables from case to case, they might make useful additions to the
set of considerations judges worry about in fashioning their remedies.
But again, courts are not likely to be good at that. They are in no posi-
tion to make complicated assessments of litigants' inner lives.
So the appeal of the easy positions tends to be overwhelmed by
uncertainties: enmities that may or may not have an honorable pedi-
gree; enmities that may or may not be socially useful; enmities that
may or may not reflect the considered desires of their holders at other
times, or even at the time they arise; enmities that may cause their
holders to take pleasure in making their adversaries worse off, or that
may just cause their holders to decline on principle to bargain with
their adversaries. We thus are in the position of requiring a general
and necessarily crude response to a complicated, context-sensitive
76 See Lawrence Lessig, The Regulation of Social Meaning, 62 U Chi L Rev 943,952, 998,
1002 (1995) (discussing the effect of norms on the use of seatbelts in Budapest cabs).
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problem. Any answer we devise is going to produce errors of one va-
riety or another-or perhaps several types at once-some share of the
time. The best we likely can do is to consider the different types of er-
rors a rule can generate, and ask which seem most tolerable. I argue
for a presumption against treating enmities as a reason to award
damages. I believe this has advantages over the alternative from the
standpoints of both efficiency and autonomy.
B. Errors
Consider the choice of rules for handling enmity to be a tradeoff
between the false positives and false negatives that such rules can
create. By a false positive, I mean a case where damages are awarded
because the enmity between the parties is thought to be shallow or
unworthy of respect, but where the enmity in fact has a distinguished
pedigree: A has a reason for declining to deal with B that either is
very good or should have an unusually strong claim to immunity from
public second-guessing. An example of a good reason would be a hei-
nous wrong committed by B that all would agree should entitle A to
have nothing further to do with B-perhaps a flagrant violation by B
of an important norm, such as deliberate attempts by B to make A
miserable.m An example of a reason with a strong claim to immunity
from being second-guessed would be acrimony based on a difference
in certain types of private values: A takes the position that she is an-
swerable to no authority but the Lord, and so will not bargain, or
wants little to do with B because she finds B's politics offensive.7
Those are high-visibility examples in the sense that the actor's basis
for the refusal is a type of objection that outsiders can comprehend
and may deem important enough to the actor's autonomy to be wor-
thy of respect. More commonly the reasons for enmity are not linked
to politics or religion, and therefore are less visible to outsiders and
more difficult for them to grasp and assess-yet nevertheless may be
comparably important to their holders and entitled to the same
weight. An award of damages on account of enmity thus may amount
to a forced sale of rights under circumstances where it is feasible to let
the parties decide whether to make a consensual exchange, and where
77 See, for example, O'Cain v O'Cain, 322 SC 551,473 SE2d 460, 467 (SC App 1996); 44
Plaza, Inc v Gray-Pac Land Co, 845 SW2d 576,577-78 (Mo App 1992); and discussion of the
background of those cases in Farnsworth, 66 U Chi L Rev at 428-33 (cited in note 4).
78 See Ball v Jorgenson, 147 Or App 55,934 P2d 634, 635 (1997) (refusing to bargain to-
ward an efficient result when Jorgenson diverted water onto Ball's property), and discussion in
Farnsworth, 66 U Chi L Rev at 428-33 (cited in note 4).
79 In Parker v Ashford, 661 S2d 213,214 (Ala 1995), discussed in Farnsworth, 66 U Chi L
Rev at 402,427-28 (cited in note 4), one of the lawyers explained that animosity between the
parties ran high in part because Parker was a "property rights Democrat" in a Republican
county.
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the parties' reasons for not bargaining may be as good as any reasons
parties ever have for failing to reach a deal. A false positive in this
sense can amount to a serious invasion of the parties' autonomy. Simi-
lar examples of false positives would be cases where enmities are
overridden with damages because this is thought to be what the par-
ties "really" want in some sense-only it is not, in fact, what they
really want.
By a false negative, I mean a case where a court awards a prop-
erty right and no bargaining follows because of acrimony that is of the
most irrational or objectionable variety: for example, bigotry or rank
schadenfreude on the part of the winner. Here the cost of the error is
the gain in wealth prevented by the preferences that should not count,
according to some collective determination. Likewise, cases where
courts award property rights and the parties fail to bargain because of
enmities that they will regret later (but then it will be too late), or that
every other self in their repertoire would wish not to see given effect;
or enmities that cause the parties to avoid bargaining just to avoid the
humiliation of making concessions to one another, while both pri-
vately wish on some level that there were some way to get the deal
done without the ritual of a consensual exchange. These error costs
should not be presumed small. With the parties to litigation fre-
quently locked into bilateral monopolies, the results of bad enmity
can be ugly.'O
Now we could, of course, try to imagine a simple head-to-head
comparison of these various possible error costs. An economic analy-
sis might regard as an error cost in false positive cases the difference
between whatever award of damages a court might make and the ac-
tual price that would have been required to get the parties to set aside
their well-earned hard feelings or values. That error cost could then
be compared to whatever costs result in false negative cases when an
otherwise promising bargain is blocked by bad acrimony. But the er-
rors involved in cases of false positives arguably are different in kind
from the errors when false negatives occur. In the case of a false posi-
tive, the court is not merely ordering a sale at the wrong price; in a
sense the court may be considered wrongful in ordering a sale at all.
That is the difference between the cases involving acrimony that we
are discussing here and superficially similar cases where subjective
values run high and are likely to render an award of damages inaccu-
rate. In cases involving large subjective values, the notion of a sale it-
80 See Richard A. Epstein, Principles for a Free Society: Reconciling Individual Liberty
with the Common Good 224-28 (Perseus 1998) (discussing the possibility that "bad blood" be-
tween parties may prevent them from bargaining around property rights in encroachment cases,
and arguing that this outcome is justified by the incentive that property rights create for parties
to take precautions against encroaching in the first place).
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self may not be repugnant to the parties. They dispute only the price.
But when the notion of a bargain is itself repugnant to either or both
parties (on account of enmity, norms against transacting, or both), or-
dering a transfer of rights for cash does some violence to the parties'
liberty-their ability to express their values through choices about
whether and when to bargain and enter into exchanges, as distinct
from their choice of price. 1 In other words, there is something bother-
some in tallying as just another error cost the damage done in over-
riding a party's wish not to think in terms of cost. It amounts to cop-
ing with commodification values by steamrolling them into primary
values: the decision not to haggle over X is itself regarded as subject
to haggling. This may eat away at norms against haggling. Perhaps see-
ing forced transactions ordered by courts makes unforced transac-
tions in the same circumstances seem more palatable.
Even apart from all this, there is the conundrum of how to meas-
ure preferences to avoid measurement and treatment of an earned
enmity as subject to pricing. By their nature, these sorts of commodi-
fication preferences against pricing and bargaining are peculiarly re-
sistant to estimation by reference to any market. Estimating their size
in an error cost analysis is itself an error-prone exercise in unguided
speculation.
False positives-forced transactions when for good reason there
would be no consent-also create economic risks for reasons that by
now are familiar: the court would be meddling in an iterated game,
the other innings of which are not likely to be clearly visible. We want
parties to worry that if they treat each other shabbily-either before
the lawsuit or during the course of the litigation-one consequence
may be the befouling of negotiations, including negotiations after any
eventual judgment between them. Removing that sanction in the pur-
suit of efficiency may have consequences that are unintended, invisi-
ble, and inefficient. Courts, like the individuals described earlier in
this Article," often may advance efficiency best by maintaining a cer-
tain indifference to it, rather than gumming up the works with an ex-
cess of cleverness.
The false negatives-cases where bad enmities are allowed to
prevent an otherwise welfare-improving bargain-do not seem as
bothersome. A litigant's refusal to bargain with an adversary corre-
sponds roughly to the expressions of enmity to which the law justifia-
bly is indifferent elsewhere. If A wants to make a deal with B but gets
nowhere in negotiations because of enmity between them, he cannot
81 For a discussion of this distinction and how it is drawn by various critics of economic
analysis, see Jane B. Baron and Jeffrey L. Dunoff, Against Market Rationality: Moral Critiques of
Economic Analysis in Legal Theory, 17 Cardozo L Rev 431,432 (1996).
82 See text accompanying notes 37-42.
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go to court and demand that the transaction be ordered on terms the
judge sees fit. (Actually he can do this in certain classes of cases
where the enmity has been collectively judged an unacceptable basis
for decision, but not in cases where the enmity is personal.) I argued
earlier that part of the sense behind the public indifference to cases
like this is that a refusal to bargain is a passive sanction that does not
involve out-of-pocket expenditures to make another worse off. The
analogy from these cases to those that involve no bargaining after
judgment is rough because parties to a litigated dispute frequently
will be locked into a bilateral monopoly. As we have seen, a rebuffed
trading partner normally can find other partners with whom to trans-
act, making the cost of the rejection relatively small; but the cost be-
comes larger if the rebuffed party cannot turn to a larger market for
relief. Yet, even then the immediate pecuniary loss is capped at the
size of the lost surplus from bargaining, and the passivity of the sanc-
tion makes it less likely to provoke expensive and escalating rounds
of retaliation. Of course the litigation itself may well have involved
such expenditures, again making the issue a bit more complicated. But
so far as we know, litigation is a sufficiently well-cabined and explic-
itly law-governed form of feuding that it does not normally provoke
the kind of escalations that make active, out-of-pocket expressions of
enmity worrisome.
There is another point to add to the benefit side of the ledger as
well, even in cases involving false negatives-that is, cases in which a
property right from a court gives the upper hand to a party with un-
kind designs on his adversary, and in circumstances where there is no
market into which the adversary can escape. The threat of this possi-
bility naturally induces great care ex ante by parties eager to avoid
being put into such a position. This is not always good. There is such a
thing as too much care, whether in inefficient efforts to fulfill a con-
tract or in excessively costly measures to avoid creating a nuisance.
But in some circumstances the cost of taking precautions is low-and
in some cases, too, the problems created by a mistake or conflict of
uses are terribly difficult for a court to remedy or undo in a satisfac-
tory manner. Disputes over the sale of a piece of real property, or en-
croachment over its boundaries, are frequent examples. The values in-
volved in such cases may be hard to quantify accurately, making the
expected error costs from any judicial decision high. Indeed, equitable
remedies traditionally are reserved for precisely such cases-those
where money seems (for this reason or others) an unsatisfactory rem-
edy for the wrong done. It often is highly desirable that those wrongs
be avoided in the first instance because their accurate rectification is
83 See Douglas Laycock, The Death of the Irreparable Injury Rule 3-7 (Oxford 1991).
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so difficult. The threat of the potentially brutal outcome in which the
parties' legal obligations must be carried through without likely relief
by negotiation creates a large incentive for care in such instancesY We
thus indulge one type of arguable error cost-occasional beastly be-
havior by a party armed with a property right-to avoid another:
more than occasional cases in which courts have to award damages to
remedy injuries that are hard to monetize, and in doing so make er-
ror-prone judgments about valuation that threaten a different sort of
violence to the parties' preferences.
Finally, there is no reason to think that if indefensible enmities
are indulged they will have bad systemic effects. Racism was men-
tioned earlier as a ground for refusing to transact that is regarded as
invidious and thus impermissible, at least in contexts where it can be
detected at manageable cost. If enmity generally were on the same
footing as racism, that might be a ground for treating enmity like a
transaction cost in situations where it commonly arises. But racism
has effects that tend to work to the systematic disadvantage of select
groups of people. The effects of enmity, and the nontransacting it may
cause in some settings, are likely to be distributed randomly among
plaintiffs and defendants who themselves are not likely to share any
characteristics in particular. Perhaps the rule can be said to be hard
on the irascible, but that is a class whose membership we might just as
soon see diminished in any event.
A special case in favor of judicial intervention to circumvent en-
mities might be made when the enmities are a result of the litigation
process itself. It could seem perverse for a court to defer in fashioning
a remedy to preferences that were formed by the very process of
seeking the remedy. Even if it makes sense for a court generally to
take the parties' preferences as it finds them, it might seem quite an-
other matter for a court first to shape the parties' preferences by es-
tablishing an adversarial process for resolving their dispute and then
to defer the preferences as if they had been found in the world rather
than made in the courthouse. I present this view because it holds
some appeal, but I am not inclined to agree with it. Litigation is en-
dogenous to the rest of life. If B behaves dishonorably in conducting a
lawsuit, and A decides not to bargain with him after judgment as a re-
sult, why should a court undo this decision? (And why should a court
relieve B of the fear that A might exercise such leverage as a sanction
for bad behavior during the litigation?) One can imagine a judge, af-
ter supervising a lawsuit for a year or so, drawing conclusions about
the parties' behavior within it and taking at least this much into ac-
84 For elaboration of the point, see Epstein, Principles for a Free Society at 225-28 (cited
in note 80).
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count in devising a remedy by reference or analogy to the doctrine of
unclean hands.8' But even within suits, supervising judges often are in
a poor position to assess whether enmities are justified. They may par-
ticipate in a conference call or conduct a settlement conference, but
they are likely to miss out on the little moments of misbehavior and
discourtesy in a litigation that give enmities gusto. So here as else-
where, by second-guessing private preferences and overriding them, a
court risks upsetting other balances and orderings between the parties
that have a logic and efficiency of their own.
There may, of course, be sound arguments for using procedures in
litigation that reduce the likelihood of enmity between the parties.
Nobody wants enmity, or is made better off by it per se; so if a situa-
tion that generates acrimony can be avoided altogether, all else equal
it ought to be avoided, perhaps by considering less acrimonious ways
to resolve cases than by an intensely adversarial process. But some in-
stitution must serve as the last resort for those parties who cannot re-
solve their differences amicably. Litigation will tend to be the place
such parties turn, often with enmities already well on their way to ma-
turity.
C. Liberalism, Utilitarianism, and Commodification Preferences
The handling of enmity recommended above-that is, leaving it
alone-can be understood as a liberal rather than a more directly
utilitarian response to the difficulties it presents. Those two ap-
proaches differ slightly in the weight they give to consensual decisions
by the parties; the differences can be traced to different understand-
ings of property rights and their purposes. The hard line consensualist
position might be understood as following from basic principles of
liberalism-Blackstone's notion of property as "sole and despotic
dominion' ' 6 over external things, or in Elster's phrasing, the idea that
"all individuals should have a private domain within which they are
dictators."' Liberalism favors the assignment to individuals of spheres
of authority that are absolute or nearly so. The decision not to sell
property to a neighbor is, perhaps with a few exceptions, really not
85 See Dan B. Dobbs, Law of Remedies: Damages--Equity-Restitution § 2.4(2) at 68-72
(West 2d ed 1993) (discussing the unclean hands doctrine).
86 Blackstone, 2 Commentaries at *2 (cited in note 46). For a discussion suggesting that
this famous definition is a "cartoon or trope," and was understood as such by Blackstone, see
Carol M. Rose, Canons of Property Talk, or Blackstone's Anxiety, 108 Yale L J 601,631 (1998).
87 Elster, Sour Grapes at 31 (cited in note 7). For similar definitions focusing on the notion
of an individual's jurisdiction, within which choices are immune from scrutiny, see Randy E.
Barnett, The Structure of Liberty: Justice and the Rule of Law 64-65 (Clarendon 1998) ("[T]o
have property in a physical resource-including one's body-means that one is free to use this
resource in any way one chooses provided that this use does not infringe upon the rights of oth-
ers.").
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open to public second-guessing regardless of the reasons for it. In ad-
dition to securing a measure of individual autonomy that often is con-
sidered attractive, this approach has the advantage of facilitating the
creation of wealth by requiring entitlements to change hands through
voluntary transactions that by assumption will make both parties bet-
ter oft On this view, if it is appropriate to use liability rules to protect
rights when transaction costs are high, it is because that practice is
consistent with what we believe are the parties' desires.
While liberalism regards economic improvement as a happy and
predictable byproduct of rights devised primarily to protect liberty,
utilitarianism-or, more specifically, the variety of welfare economics
that amounts to a modified utilitarianism-regards liberty as a good
consequence of property rights devised primarily to maximize welfare
or wealth. The two approaches function similarly-so similarly that a
utilitarian might favor the liberal approach as a more efficacious
means of maximizing utility than a more direct economic utilitarian-
ism. The chief practical drawback of the liberal view is that it leaves
little room for tampering when, as in the case of enmity, a firm com-
mitment to property rights and their voluntary exchange might some-
times seem at odds with the well-being of the parties measured in
some other way. The chief drawback of the utilitarian impulse to
meddle in such situations is that the practice of meddling may do
more overall harm than good. For once revealed preferences and vol-
untary exchanges can be overridden by planners with ideas different
from those of the parties about what is best for them or what they
"really" want for themselves, the door is open to a number of poten-
tial abuses and blunders.
The differences between the liberal and utilitarian approaches
generate different perspectives on the problem of bargaining after
judgment. One way to interpret the problem of enmity is by asking
whether a consensual bargain in which B buys the rights from A is
significant only as evidence that B values the rights more than A. If
that is the case, then it remains possible that the evidence is mislead-
ing-that even if the two parties would not be interested in consent-
ing to a deal for whatever reason, B still might value the rights more
than A. Perhaps B would bid more for the rights at an auction, and
this, rather than whether the parties would enter into an exchange, is
the best measure of valuation. Compare this alternative interpreta-
tion: if B would outbid A if the rights were auctioned, this is mere evi-
dence bearing on whether the parties would want to make a deal if
they could in which A sells the rights to B. The important question
remains whether mutual consent to a bargain exists, either literally or
in some plausible hypothetical sense, and is being frustrated by exter-
nal obstacles that call for a court's intervention. It follows from this
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view that if bargaining between the parties is practically feasible,
awarding property rights makes sense even if the parties are unlikely
to bargain over them on account of enmities or other preferences
they hold.
While either of those models of rights is capable in principle of
accommodating commodification preferences, liberal models are
likely to do a better job of it. Utilitarian approaches to rights create
more opportunities for public estimates of people's valuation of rights
because they are less likely to regard opportunities for consent as
comprising a conclusive case against the making of such estimates.
Commodification preferences tend not to do well in those public es-
timates for a number of reasons. The estimates usually are based on
market measures that presuppose a decision to put the rights up for
sale. The set of relevant values plugged into the planner's cost-benefit
calculator tends to be thin: nonpecuniary or moral preferences easily
are regarded as too speculative, trivial, irrational, awkward to discuss,
or hard to measure to be worth worrying about. When individuals
make their own decisions about the use of their entitlements, they
implicitly take account of commodification preferences in ways that
are difficult for public tribunals to simulate. They can digest the dispa-
rate values at stake-commensurable and not, nonpecuniary and
moral preferences, as well as preferences for cash-and express the
resulting synthesis not in words but in a decision that can be rich in its
inputs and unlikely to hurt others too badly if it is not.
The liberal tradition thus provides a natural mechanism for the
conservation and expression of complicated commodification prefer-
ences. It is a natural mechanism for coping with enmity in particular,
because it obviates the need for imponderable collective judgments
about whether particular enmities are a good or bad thing. Individuals
confronted with complicated problems like enmity in their own lives
tend to be better positioned to render nuanced judgments and deci-
sions about them than public officials theorizing about their lives
generally and at a distance. And efficient decisions as well: judges are
not the only ones whose common sense may be informed by a sense
of costs and benefits; ordinary people can be the same way, and they
know more about their cases and their lives than the judges do. Hence
the preference of liberalism for resolving doubtful cases fraught with
empirical and conceptual uncertainties, such as the conundrum of
enmity, in favor of resolution by individuals on behalf of themselves.
These arguments bear a resemblance to positions sometimes
taken in debates about incommensurability, a problem most often as-
sociated with social judgments about valuation and about the kinds of
bargains people ought to be allowed to make. The most prominent
claim in the debate is that people ought to be limited in the contracts
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they can make because some goods are considered incommensurable
with cash-not by the parties (who by assumption want to make a
trade), but by their society, or by the courts called upon to enforce the
parties' deal.n My interest here is in the opposite question about
commensurability: whether and when parties ought to be forced by
the courts to regard their rights or their anger as commensurable with
cash, accepting damages even where a property right is an available
remedy and where they would not want to bargain over such rights if
they were awarded. The critical question in debates about commensu-
rability typically is not just whether given values are commensurable,
but who should decide whether they are commensurable. Economists
who favor broad private rights of contract, and the privatized deci-
sions about commensurability that such rights entail, may neverthe-
less be untroubled by the opposite prospect of awarding parties dam-
ages instead of property rights based on estimates of the pecuniary
gains from trade to be had between them and the existence of bother-
some transaction costs. No doubt this is partly because of the implicit
assumptions economists often make about the content of people's
preferences-that they usually are ready to peddle their entitlements
without being distracted by problems of enmity or commensurability.
Those who believe that commodification preferences are a larger,
more important, and more attractive feature of valuation than that
naturally should be more skittish about authorizing damages when re-
lying on consensual trades is feasible.
D. Limitations
The discussion so far has considered whether property rights are
desirable remedies from a perspective mostly internal to a case-a
perspective that assumes, in other words, that the only parties who
stand to lose anything as a result of the enmity are the ones embroiled
in the dispute. Of course the decision to award equitable relief may be
affected by any number of other considerations, many of them involv-
ing the costs such relief can create for others: for third parties affected
by the remedy, for example, or for the court that has to administer it.
Those remain solid reasons for withholding equitable remedies-and
perhaps become stronger reasons-where enmity is pervasive. First,
the remedy a court issues may affect third parties who may have had
no part, or anyway no culpable part, in whatever drama gave rise to
88 For general discussions, see Richard A. Epstein, Are Values Incommensurable, or Is Util-
ity the Ruler of the World?, 1995 Utah L Rev 683, 699 (discussing the commensurability of par-
ties' subjective preferences); Sunstein, 92 Mich L Rev at 849-51 (cited in note 71) (claiming that
certain goods should neither be bought nor sold); Elizabeth Anderson, Value in Ethics and Eco-
nomics 55-64 (Harvard 1993) (discussing incommensurable goods). See also Margaret Jane
Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 Duke L J 56,56 (1993).
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the enmity between the parties to the suit. In cases where the costs of
a refusal to bargain so ripple out toward others, the costs of a false
negative-an incorrect conclusion that the enmity is warranted or
otherwise is a legitimate source of utility-can multiply. And since the
third parties by assumption are innocent of anything that would war-
rant enmity toward them, they are being punished for nothing. They
feel the brunt of the enmity without being deterred by the prospect of
it. Sometimes it may be plausible to suppose that the costs of enmity
to innocent third parties are impounded in the offer made to buy the
property right by means of contracts the third parties have with the
party against whom the enmity is directed. But often this is infeasible,
and then we are confronted with cases in which the costs and benefits
of letting a party effect enmity with a property right are balanced less
favorably.
Second, a court may find that situations where enmity is signifi-
cant present especially difficult problems of supervision. It depends
on the case and the details of the remedy. Even apart from enmity, a
remedy in the form of a property right that thrusts the parties into an
extended relationship is a worry to a court that will have to monitor
their compliance with it. The worries merely are multiplied if the par-
ties' relations are beset with enmity, because it is liable to create fric-
tion in the relationship the court will be supervising. It is hard enough
for a court to evaluate compliance with an ongoing injunction when
the parties are acting in good faith, even of the reluctant variety. En-
mity can motivate heightened efforts by parties to overenforce the
terms of an injunction or to evade its spirit, as well as efforts by one
side to tweak the other in ways that will produce satisfaction for the
antagonist without being substantial or visible enough to be caught by
the court. All this makes it harder for a court to supervise effectively
the enforcement of the injunction, and supports an extra measure of
judicial reluctance to issue orders subject to these risks. The issue ad-
mittedly is a delicate one, because a practice of avoiding injunctions
where enmity threatens to undercut their efficacy creates an incentive
for the party opposing such a remedy to manufacture enmity in
appearance or in fact.
As an example of these considerations, think of a case where a
court finds that the plaintiff has been wrongfully discharged from his
job. At the remedial stage the plaintiff requests a court order reinstat-
ing him; the employer argues for an award of front pay with no rein-
statement. Assume that if the employee were ordered reinstated, the
employer would want to get rid of him, and thus would be ready to of-
fer an amount of cash sufficient to cover the employee's actual pecu-
niary damages (that is, enough to cover wages for however many
weeks it is likely to take the employee to find alternative employ-
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ment, perhaps along with some additional sum in case the next job
does not pay as well). But then also assume that relations between the
parties have been sufficiently befouled by the litigation to make a
bargain of this sort unlikely. The employee wants his job back, and has
been too embittered by past dealings with the corporate employer to
sit still for negotiations of the sort just described. For a large enough
sum-a substantial enough "acrimony premium" -he no doubt would
change his mind, but those sums are unlikely to be forthcoming from
the employer. What to do?
Judge Posner has analogized reinstatement in similar circum-
stances to a forced marriage in a regime without divorce:n it may have
untoward consequences for third parties. The costs of the enmity may
not just be the forgone bargain the employer and employee would be
able to make if it were not present. Coworkers and consumers may be
made worse off too, if the enmity manifests itself in low-level ways-
sullen interactions with customers, efforts to poison the attitudes of
colleagues, or acts of sabotage difficult to prove or prevent. In princi-
ple the employer might raise the size of the offer it makes to the em-
ployee to reflect its interest in avoiding these risks, but it is not clear
why the employer should have to do this. It effectively would be pay-
ing the employee not only to forgo the enforcement of his remedy but
also to prevent him from doing things he is not supposed to do but
might be able to pull off under cover of the remedy. Any amount the
employer did offer for this purpose would be highly imprecise, and
would be passed on to customers and other employees who likewise
would be paying to avoid aspects of the remedy the court did not
mean to create. And the prospect of such payments would give the
employee an incentive to make himself more menacing and the risks
of trouble he might create more ominous so as to extract a large ran-
som from the employer. None of these problems might be serious in a
world of perfect judicial information, but again the cost to a court of
detecting all these behaviors accurately would be prohibitive.
In addition, supervising the resulting employment relationship
may be a nightmare for the court. Assume the enmity runs from em-
ployer to employee as well as (or instead of) vice versa. Reassignment
of the employee to less satisfying work for bogus reasons, hyperatten-
tive and officious supervision of his labors, and petty exercises of dis-
cretion against his interests all are complaints the employee might
raise. They might be false complaints; they might be true, but the em-
ployer's actions might be necessary correctives to the sullen behavior
89 Avitia v Metropolitan Club of Chicago, Inc, 49 F3d 1219, 1231 (7th Cir 1995) ("[T]he
costs in reduced productivity caused by locking parties into an unsatisfactory employment rela-
tion [ ] is the industrial equivalent of a failed marriage in a regime of no divorce.").
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mentioned a moment ago (an instance of escalation); or the com-
plaints might be entirely valid, and the employer's actions unneces-
sary. A judge likely would have difficulty discriminating between
these possibilities, finding both that it takes a long time and that the
resulting judgments are prone to error. These all are good reasons for
special hesitation before using property rights as remedies in cases
where enmity is likely and the remedy, rather than being a one-shot
intervention, would force the parties into a longer-term relationship
under the court's jurisdiction. They amount to limitations-
"utilitarian constraints," in Professor Epstein's usage,- on the liberal
strategy of using property rights to cope with enmity and the other
complicated preferences parties hold.
VI. ENMITY AND EMOTION
In an insightful paper discussing various intersections of law and
emotions, Eric Posner has suggested that the existence of enmity be-
tween parties involved in some types of disputes might be a good rea-
son to withhold property rights as remedies.9 He reaches this view by
suggesting that enmity is a product of emotion, or perhaps a species of
it; this permits him to assimilate the problem of enmity after judg-
ment into a more general model that calls for comparisons of parties'
preferences when they are in the "calm state" and the "emotion
state," enmities being an example of the latter. The model treats emo-
tions as forces that cause temporary changes in people's preferences.
When they are in the grip of emotions, people try to satisfy their new,
emotionally produced preferences with the same means-ends ration-
ality they use the rest of the time. The challenge for the law is to give
people incentives, where feasible, to avoid situations likely to provoke
emotions that will cause them to have undesirable temporary prefer-
ences. So hotheads should avoid bars where they are prone to get into
fights, and the law should encourage the avoidance by punishing them
if they fail to do so. But more latitude should be given to people
whose emotions get them into trouble in ways that could not easily
have been predicted, since difficulties of prediction make deterrence
difficult as well.n
Without more, economic conclusions follow one way or the other
from a preference's psychological origins. There is no general reason
to treat preferences with an emotional pedigree as less socially valu-
able than others. Sometimes they may be more valuable. Posner's ar-
90 Richard A. Epstein, Nuisance Law: Corrective Justice and Its Utilitarian Constraints, 8 J
Legal Stud 49,50 (1979).
91 Posner, 89 Georgetown L J at 2010 (cited in note 5).
92 Id at 1981,1995-97.
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gument is, first, that when emotions cause people to behave in ways
considered undesirable on independent grounds, it makes sense to
prefer and appeal to their calm state preferences. If the emotion state
creates preferences for violence, for example, then the preferences of
the calm state will be the privileged ones-not because preferences
produced by emotions necessarily are bad, but because a preference
for violence has been deemed bad. But enmity that makes bargaining
impossible is not quite like that, because the decision to favor the
calm or the emotional preferences cannot be made by saying that the
behavior caused by the one (bargaining) is better than the behavior
caused by the other (no bargaining). To say that would be circular be-
cause it would beg the critical question of which preferences should
be used to measure the efficiency of the outcome: those in the calm
state or those in the state of enmity. The preference not to bargain is
not like the choice to be violent; it cannot be condemned with an ap-
peal to larger judgments against it made elsewhere in law or society.
Posner's other principal argument is that preferences experi-
enced during emotional states should be discounted if that is what the
party would want while in the calm state from which he began and to
which he will return. In the contract setting, Posner thus argues that a
practice of awarding specific performance to parties who are unable
to reach agreement on account of enmity would make contracting
more expensive ex ante: when the contract is drawn up, the seller will
anticipate that if he later tries to breach, the buyer may become upset
and enforce his right to specific performance despite settlement offers
that would seem reasonable but for his indignation. Since this would
make life more expensive for the seller, the buyer will have to pay up
front to cover such a possibility-in effect, as Posner says, being
"forced, against his calm state preferences, to purchase the right when
angry to spite the seller!"" But this may not quite characterize the
situation accurately. It is true that the calm state preference of the
buyer is not to spite the seller, but that is because as yet he has been
given no reason to do so. His calm state preference also is that the
seller behave in conformity with whatever norms are in place, includ-
ing norms of promise-keeping and performance, and thus avoid pre-
cipitating any enmities. If the seller is anxious that he be able to dis-
appoint those expectations without being subject to too much retalia-
tion, he can try to specify a damages remedy in the contract-and
now he may be the one who ends up paying "extra," this time for the
privilege of being able to engage in behavior that normally would
cause relations between the parties to sour and would make it harder
for him to extricate himself from his obligations.
93 Id at 2008.
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I do not know what the actual consequences of these competing
hopes and fears would be for the price of contracts. Perhaps none. My
point is only that identifying people's calm state preferences at the
time they enter into contracts is more complicated than simply asking
whether they then have any wish to spite their partners. They may well
have "if, then" wishes to preserve their rights if betrayals or other un-
appetizing contingencies arise-the right, in short, to get justifiably
angry and take a hard line if circumstances warrant, which everyone
assumes they will not. It probably is unwise to try to predict too con-
fidently whether, how, or how effectively parties anticipate in their
contracts the possibility that their preferences may later be funda-
mentally changed by the behavior of their transacting partners.
I believe a more fundamental difficulty with Professor Posner's
framework is his decision to style enmity as an emotion, defining
emotions as temporary disruptions of baseline preferences-
preferences that soon return. It no doubt is true that a key question in
deciding whether to privilege the preferences of any earlier state over
those of a later state is whether and in what form the earlier state re-
turns and is accompanied by regret over what was done in the interim.
If we are sure the calm self will return and regret the acts of the emo-
tional self, we may have a basis for discounting the emotional self's
preferences, for then we are giving the person what he (most of the
time) wants. But if the earlier self never returns, or if it returns unac-
companied by regret over the acts committed while it was away, it is
hard to see why its preferences necessarily should be king. It might
seem odd to imagine the emotion state to be permanent, and the cal
state never to return. But the reason for the oddity is the decision to
classify enmity or anger as emotions, and thus as temporary. The clas-
sification is misleading. People can be calm and angry at the same
time; to put the point differently, we might, with Aristotle, distinguish
between the "irrationality" of anger and the rationality of hatred.4
Hatred is more durable. Classification problems to one side, the im-
portant point is that the enmities people develop when they believe
they have been wronged can last a long time and cause permanent
changes in their preferences.9
Think of a seller who breaches a contract, causing the buyer to
become indignant. The buyer's enmity, and resulting new preference
94 Aristotle, The Politics *1312b, lines 18-34 (Chicago 1984) (Cares Lord, trans).
95 For discussion of the durability of anger, see Jon Elster, Emotions and Economic The-
ory, 36 J Econ Lit 47, 70-72 (1998) (discussing the enduring nature of anger); Stephen Wilson,
Feuding, Conflict, and Banditry in Nineteenth-Century Corsica 30, 280 (Cambridge 1988) (de-
scribing long-lasting acrimonious quarrels in Corsica). For a general discussion, see Milovan
Djilas, Land without Justice (Harcourt Brace 1958) (discussing centuries-long acrimonious
struggles in Yugoslavia).
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to avoid the seller, may go away in a few days, or it may result in disil-
lusionment that never quite dissipates and that causes him to lose in-
terest in making deals with his new nemesis, whether much later on,
or after judgment in any litigation that results, or in negotiations that
serve as a substitute for litigation. It then is neither here nor there
whether the reaction is labeled a form of anger, enmity, or emotion.
There is just an earlier self and a later selW separated by events that
caused a change in attitudes and beliefs. There is no calm self to which
the seller reverts after a temporary interruption.
My difference with Professor Posner may be largely empirical: he
describes the enmities that can follow judgment as temporary distur-
bances that make someone seem not himself-his calm state-for a
little while. I agree that enmities sometimes are accompanied by gusts
of emotion that have those characteristics, but regard them as poten-
tially lasting much longer and as more likely to change the identity of
the self and its preferences in an ongoing way. I view them as likely to
be felt preferences rather than as emotions in the sense just described.
But I might add that if Posner is correct, then the problem he de-
scribes seems at least somewhat self-regulating. If the anger associ-
ated with a litigated contract dispute is of the short-lived variety asso-
ciated with most of the other types of emotions he discusses in his pa-
per,.9 then in most cases the party's calm state preferences presumably
will spring back to their former shape in time to make bargaining af-
ter judgment possible. If the anger is durable enough to wipe out all
chances for bargaining throughout the time period in which negotia-
tions would be feasible, then perhaps the anger is entitled to more re-
spect after all; for then it seems not to be the sort of brief outburst
that we are comfortable bracketing as an anomalous bit of turbulence
in the actor's preferences.
The difference between our views as a practical matter, at any
rate, is that Professor Posner believes property rights should be least
available as remedies when the defendant's breach of contract is
"egregious" or, in nuisance cases, where the nuisance creates "anger
and hard feelings." It is not entirely clear what Posner has in mind in
speaking of an egregious breach of contract, but in the context of his
argument it seems just to mean any breach likely to make the pro-
misee angry, presumably by offending his sensibilities or norms that
he values. Whether the resulting enmity is justified depends on the
ethical and economic standing of those norms and sensibilities, and as
we have seen these may be subtle questions to which there are no
96 For example, the anger that may entitle a defendant to receive a shorter sentence if it
causes him to kill, or the revulsion jurors feel when they see gruesome pictures of crime scenes.
97 Posner, 89 Georgetown L J at 2009-10 (cited in note 5).
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general answers possible and no specific answers available to a court.
But I see no reason to presume that a party at the short end of an
"egregious" breach would be unreasonable in experiencing enmity as
a result, and in consequently taking a hard line in any negotiations
with the promisor. Without such a presumption we are left with the
proposition that the more offensive the defendant's acts, the more
likely the plaintiff is to refuse to bargain with him, and the more im-
portant it then becomes that the plaintiff be denied a property right
and given damages instead. That is approximately the opposite of the
position argued in this Article, which is that if a violation of the plain-
tiff's rights is of a nature that has a profound effect on his commodifi-
cation preferences, causing him not to want to bargain over his rights
with the party who committed the invasion, the law generally should
regard that as no reason to deny him a property right as a remedy.
Exceptions to the principle may be warranted if the basis of the en-
mity evidently offends public policy, but making exceptions to it in
precisely those cases where the enmity most likely is justified seems
backward.
CONCLUSION
This Article has argued for a view of enmity between parties as
one of many commodification preferences they may hold. Commodi-
fication preferences are preferences about whether to bargain over
rights and with whom, as opposed to measures of value that in effect
just ask how much a person would charge for his rights (or bid for
them) if they were sold at an auction. Commodification preferences
often can be important aspects of value in legal settings, but are easy
for economists to overlook because economic analysis usually focuses
on values registered after the decision to participate in a market has
been made or forced on a party.
Enmity can generate particularly ambiguous commodification
preferences. Hardly anybody wants enmity; most people would prefer
to avoid the occasions for it, and the satisfaction of it is not a source
of utility that the law tries to maximize. Yet, in a private setting, en-
mity may be a reasonable and socially useful source of preferences. It
is a common reaction to conflicts of interest and to breaches of coop-
erative norms, and the threat of enmity and of retaliation is an impor-
tant enforcer of those norms. Ordinarily it is not likely to cause great
harm so long as its expression is channeled into passive forms, mean-
ing forms that may be costly to others but that do not involve out-of-
pocket expenditures to make others worse off. This helps explain why
the law punishes enmity when it motivates affirmative harmful acts,
especially ones unlawful on other grounds. It also helps explain why
the law generally does not punish enmity when expressed passively,
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and is careful not to punish it, even where it is harmful to its object, if
the behavior it causes also promotes some social good.
When a court is presented with a request for a property right as a
remedy, it generally should not be dissuaded from issuing it by the
possibility, in the particular case or in the class of cases to which it be-
longs, that enmity will spoil the possibility of bargaining between the
parties after judgment. Assuming bargaining is feasible as a practical
(that is, technological) matter, the court should leave the parties to
their own devices. This result seems counterintuitive on normal un-
derstandings of the Coase theorem because it hypothesizes a case in
which there may well be no bargaining no matter what a court does,
yet in which property rights properly are awarded as remedies any-
way. The reason for this anomaly is that there are powerful commodi-
fication preferences in play in such situations; they are bona fide pref-
erences, and they should be given room for expression even if their
roots are in enmity. The enmity may be well earned. Naturally, there
are invidious and irrational enmities as well that serve no good social
purposes, but separating those enmities from the reasonable and use-
ful ones often is exceptionally difficult, and the danger of overriding
good enmity with damages is more troubling, from the standpoint of
autonomy and efficiency, than the danger that a plaintiff will express
bad enmity through obstinate enforcement of a property right.
There are some limits on this principle. If it seems clear that the
source of the enmity is one that can be condemned without hesitation
on some ground of public policy, withholding a property right that
would be used to express it may be defensible. Likewise if it becomes
clear that the parties would regard themselves as better off if the
court were to make the deal for them by awarding damages that they
cannot bear to make for themselves. But neither of these possibilities
is likely to be clear to a court as a practical matter. More plausibly, a
court might find itself confronted with a situation where enmity is
running high and preventing bargaining, and thereby work a hardship
on third parties or on the court itself. Where these possibilities are
present they are good reasons for a court to hesitate before awarding
a property right as a remedy.
Otherwise the law should treat enmity neither as a source of
value to be maximized nor as a transaction cost to be minimized. The
wiser course in the usual case is simply to take no notice of it. Where
enmity exists it is an economically and ethically complicated feature
of the private ordering the parties have created, and the law is not
likely to be able to meddle with it fruitfully.
2002]

